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3D printing technology plays a big part in the ongoing digital disruption, and it can change
the way products are designed, produced and delivered. However, in a McKinsey survey of leading
manufacturers, 40% of the respondents were ill-prepared to identify its business opportunities.
In my dissertation, we bridge this gap by rigorously studying and providing managerial insights
about new business models that utilize 3D printing. In the first two essays, we study the business
model of personal fabrication (PF) where the firm sells product’s design to the customers and lets
them personalize and manufacture the product using 3D printing services. The first essay focuses
on quality customization enabled by personal fabrication in a competitive setting. In the second
essay, we generalize our model and study how PF enables customization in both quality and taste
dimensions. We contribute a novel two-dimensional modeling framework to study personalization.
Our results characterize the attractiveness of PF strategy based on the market structure, price
vs quality consciousness of the customer base, demand uncertainty and IP/liability restrictions
of the product. In the third essay, we study the effectiveness of in-store 3D printing for product
customization under different channel structures (centralized vs decentralized), markets (niche vs
saturated), and competitive conditions. 3D printing is also fueling the maker movement and open
innovation by enabling cost-effective prototyping and design sharing. In the fourth essay of my
dissertation, we study a large unstructured data set of 3D product designs scraped from a famous
maker movement platform (thingiverse.com). We study how design innovations diffuse and interact
with innovator learning and manufacturability.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
Digital technologies are accelerating supply chain innovation thereby disrupting existing busi-
ness models (Anderson et al., 2017). In a survey of global supply chain managers by Gartner (Table
1.1), 3D printing is one of the digital technologies that are considered to be highly disruptive and
important (O’Marah and Chen, 2017). 3D printing — also known as additive manufacturing — is
a manufacturing technology that can produce parts directly from a 3D computer model, without
any need for specialized tools. It has been hailed as an enabler for the next industrial revolution
and is expected to change the way products are designed, produced and delivered to customers
(D’Aveni, 2015; Markillie, 2012; Nigro and Schiller, 2017). The technology enables manufacturing
to move closer to the customers — to a retail store or even to a customer’s home. Such a delegation
of manufacturing down the supply chain enables greater personalization while protecting the firm
against demand fluctuations (Piller et al., 2015; Gibson, 2018). However, before incorporating 3D
printing in their business models, firms need to understand the trade-offs such as capacity invest-
ment cost, higher production cost, externalities on their existing product line, and supply chain
coordination issues.
In a McKinsey survey of leading manufacturers, 40% of the respondents were unfamiliar with
3D printing and were ill-prepared to identify its business opportunities (Cohen et al., 2015b).
The tradeoffs involved in moving manufacturing closer to the customer using 3D printing are not
addressed by the academic literature as well. In my dissertation, we attempt to bridge this gap. We
study the trade-offs involved in personalization focused business models enabled by 3D printing,
which move manufacturing closer to the customer; We prescribe effective ways of employing 3D
printing in such business models.
3D printing is also fueling the maker movement and open innovation by enabling cost-effective
prototyping and design sharing (Dickel et al., 2016; Anderson, 2012). Maker movement democrat-
izes innovation by enabling individuals with great ideas to collaborate with other innovators and
produce products. The fourth essay of my dissertation focuses on how these maker communit-
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Table 1.1: Survey Result from Gartner (O’Marah and Chen, 2017): With respect to supply chain






Big data analysis 2 14 84
Internet of things 4 23 73
Cloud computing 4 27 69
Machine learning 6 32 62
Advanced robotics 8 30 62
3D printing 17 41 42
Drones/self-guided vehicles 16 43 41
Sharing economy 15 50 35
Blockchain 14 61 25
ies engage in product design innovation. Through this research, we offer insights to makerspace
platforms on how to effectively foster community-driven innovation.
1.1 Competitive Value of Personal Fabrication in Vertically Differentiated Markets
In the first essay of my dissertation, we explore how a firm can leverage the personal fabrication
(PF) phenomenon where customers control the manufacturing of the product. A firm that adopts
personal fabrication (PF) strategy, sells the products’ design directly to the customer and lets the
customers manufacture the product using 3D printing services. We characterize the market and
operational conditions that make PF an attractive operational strategy.
We use a stylized model focused on quality competition to study personalization and postpone-
ment benefits of PF strategy. Our work shows that these benefits may critically depend on market
conditions and we characterize these relations. The cost disadvantage of 3D printing relative to
traditional production is often considered as one of the key barriers to widespread adoption of PF.
However, this cost gap is expected to shrink over time following the advances in technology. Our
findings show that the changes in this cost gap will have an important implication on how PF can
compete with traditional production: while success of PF may be limited to more bottom-heavy
markets when the cost gap is higher, reductions in this cost gap can open up more top-heavy
markets for PF as well. PF brings IP risks and product liability concerns. Partial PF strategy
may alleviate some of these concerns. Interestingly, our work shows that the feasibility of partial
2
Figure 1.1: Overview of my Dissertation
PF strategy may also hinge on the reduction in the cost disadvantage of PF relative to traditional
production.
Our research provides timely insights that can help firms assess attractiveness of the PF business
model enabled by 3D printing. The discussion on PF in the business press is often centered around
its personalization benefits and the cost and IP/liability concerns. Our work contributes to this
debate by studying the interplay among these issues and the market conditions such as competition,
quality/price consciousness of the customer base and demand uncertainty, and providing deeper
insights on when PF might be a beneficial strategy.
1.2 Personal Fabrication & Design Personalization: Value of Enabling Customers to
Tweak Product Designs
In the second essay, we consider a more general setting for studying personal fabrication. When
a customer purchases a product’s design, she may personalize the product according to her taste
preferences (by tweaking the design), in addition to selecting the desired quality level (quality cus-
tomization studied in the first essay). Customizing the product’s design in the horizontal dimension
3
is generally considered to be difficult for an end customer, as it requires knowledge of specialized
software tools. However, these software tools are being made more easier and are becoming widely
used. Firms selling product designs through personal fabrication strategy have also started assisting
customers with horizontal personalization. Considering this scenario, we study personal fabrication
in 2 dimensions, where customer personalizes the product in both the dimensions.
We propose a cylindrical modeling framework to study 2 dimensional personalization enabled
by personal fabrication. In our model, the circular dimension of the cylinder represents customer’s
horizontal (taste) preferences. The length dimension of the cylinder captures their quality sensit-
ivity. With this model, we study the value of personal fabrication in different market structures
and product line characteristics. When personal fabrication enables personalization in both the
dimensions, we find that the firm can benefit in monopoly setting as well. In markets where cus-
tomers do not value horizontal personalization, personal fabrication strategy can still be profitable
in monopoly setting, if there is uncertainty about the customers’ quality sensitivity. Personal fab-
rication strategy can be profitable even if customers face a cost disadvantage of production. When
the market has stronger intensity for their taste (horizontal) preferences, PF strategy will be prof-
itable under even higher cost disadvantage levels. However, if the firm already has a product line
of more than one traditional products, value of adopting PF strategy decreases. We also show that
our insights about the partial PF strategy (to mitigate IP/liability concerns) discussed in the first
essay carry over to the generalized two dimensional model.
1.3 Delegating Production to the Retail Stores: Influence of Channel Structure and
Buzz Effect on In-store 3D Printing
Third essay of my dissertation focuses on adopting in-store 3D printing to offer customized
products. When a retailer manufactures a proportion of the product, the relationship between the
manufacturer and the retailer is quite different from a traditional supply chain. The manufacturer
needs to decide how much of the product should be manufactured at the retail location and how
much of it should be pre-made. The retailer needs to decide the amount of investment they make in a
3D printer. We propose a novel modeling framework to capture delegated and partial customization
and the supply chain dynamics in the presence of production delegation.
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We capture two key attributes of in-store 3D printing: retail store congestion due to customers’
wait times and buzz effect. In-store 3D printing implies that customers need to wait for the product
to be 3D printed, which may lead to congestion. We capture this aspect in our model. In addition
to providing a customized product, in-store 3D printing is also expected to increase retail footfall
by providing a buzz factor (Trinh, 2017; Vitone, 2016). While customization is provided by the
3D printed product, the buzz effect increases the potential demand for the firm’s standard product
line as well by increasing retail traffic. We study the effectiveness of in-store 3D printing under
different channel structures (centralized vs decentralized), different market characteristics (niche
vs saturated), and product characteristics. Using our results, we highlight the settings where the
strategy can be profitably employed.
In a centralized channel, adoption of 3D printing depends on the investment cost of 3D printer
and product design cost of delegation. In-store 3D printing can be profitable in both niche and
saturated markets. Even when these costs are low, as long as there is some non-negative investment
cost, the channel will also offer a standard product line alongside the 3D product. If the centralized
channel offers a competitor’s standard product as well, 3D printer investment cost needs to be even
lower for in-store 3D printing to be adopted. However, when the investment costs are indeed low,
the channel may offer a fully customized 3D product and will stop selling the competitor’s product.
In decentralized channel, adoption of in-store 3D printing critically depends on market satur-
ation. In-store 3D printing will not be adopted in saturated markets even if the 3D printer can
be purchased at no cost to the retailer. However, in niche markets, in-store 3D printing will be
adopted if the costs are low enough. If the decentralized channel offers a competitor’s product
at the retail level, in-store 3D printing will not be adopted, as the manufacturer will not find it
profitable. However, if there is strong enough buzz effect and/or a large enough quality advantage
for the 3D product, the decentralized channel will offer in-store 3D printing even in the presence
of competition.
5
1.4 Product Design Innovation in the Maker Movement: Impact of Innovator Learn-
ing, Innovativeness, and Manufacturability
In fourth essay of my dissertation, we study the maker movement enabled by 3D printing. Spe-
cifically, we study the success and diffusion of design innovations which lead to follow on innovations
and/or to manufactured products. We hypothesize that the variance in popularity measures can be
explained by design intricacy, manufacturability, and innovator learning. To test our hypotheses,
we scrapped a major 3D design sharing website in the maker movement —“thingiverse.com” — and
obtained a panel data set containing more than 200,000 innovators and 780,000 product designs that
they created over 9 years. The dataset also includes information on how many times a product
design is manufactured and by whom. We decode features such as design intricacy and manu-
facturability from unstructured 3D geometry data using 3D printing domain knowledge, and use
econometrics for causal inference. Our preliminary results, from randomly sampled representative
data, provide insights to makerspace platforms such as “thingiverse.com” on effectively fostering
community-driven innovation.
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CHAPTER 2: Competitive Value of Personal Fabrication in Vertically
Differentiated Markets
Personal fabrication (PF) is an emerging phenomenon enabled by additive manufacturing
(widely known and hereafter referred to as 3D printing) and computerized product designs, where
customers control the manufacturing of products (Gershenfeld, 2008). In this case, customers can
buy a product’s design and get it manufactured in their desired material, accuracy and surface finish
using firms that offer 3D printing as a service. Customers can avail 3D printing services either in
their neighborhood (e.g. Lowes or UPS stores) or over the internet (e.g. Shapeways.com). Such an
ecosystem enables firms to employ Personal Fabrication (PF) strategy : sell their product’s design
— instead of manufactured product — and delegate the product’s production to the customer,
thereby allowing her to personalize the product. Many industry analysts and thought leaders (e.g.,
Lipson and Kurman 2010, D’Aveni 2013, Rayna and Striukova 2016, Piller et al. 2015) predict PF
strategy to be the new way of delivering products to customers. There are already many examples
of this strategy: for example, independent designers sell product designs of jewelry, footwear, toys
or electronic accessories in 3D design marketplaces such as pinshape.com or cgtrader.com, which
can then be 3D printed in different materials. However, there are two important barriers that may
prevent widespread adoption of PF strategy: high production costs of 3D printing and intellectual
property/product liability concerns. Furthermore, it is not obvious whether the product person-
alization enabled by the PF strategy can benefit the firm. This is because PF strategy does not
allow customized prices based on the product configuration choices made by the customer, since
the customer personalizes the product after she purchases the product design.
Our primary research goal in this paper is to identify the market and operational characteristics
that make the PF strategy an attractive choice. PF strategy may face a cost disadvantage compared
to traditional manufacturing (Holweg, 2015). However, the cost competitiveness of 3D printing
is expected to improve drastically in the near future as a result of significant improvements in
production speed and the capability to make products using multiple materials (Orcutt, 2016;
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Abrams, 2015). Our second research goal is to study the implications of this cost evolution on
the adoption of PF strategy. While adopting PF strategy, a firm faces intellectual property (IP)
risks, since the product’s computerized design (code) can be shared over the internet (Desai and
Magliocca, 2013). Product liability is another important concern (Wang, 2016). To overcome these
issues, a firm may engage in partial PF strategy, where it identifies a proportion of the product
that has manageable IP/liability risks and delegates only that portion to the customer; the firm
produces the rest of the product itself. Our third research goal is to characterize conditions under
which such a partial PF strategy would be desirable.
In this paper, we focus on the quality (vertical) dimension of product personalization. Almost all
3D printing services offer a variety of materials and surface finish qualities at different price points.
For example, the customer may choose a low cost and low quality option through 3dhubs.com,
or choose high-end printing at high cost through Shapeways.com. We study both monopoly and
duopoly and consider PF strategy and traditional production. Furthermore, we consider top vs
bottom-heavy markets: the top-heavy market has a higher relative density of quality conscious
customers (who have a higher willingness to pay for quality), whereas the bottom-heavy market
has a higher relative density of price conscious customers (who have a lower willingness to pay for
quality). These comparisons help us tease out the value of adopting PF in different scenarios.
We find that while PF strategy generates additional value for customers because of person-
alization, a monopolist does not benefit from this personalization. In contrast, PF strategy al-
ways improves profitability when competing against a traditional firm. We further show that the
PF strategy provides the equivalent benefit of credible quality commitment: a firm adopting PF
strategy obtains the same profit as that of a traditional firm that can make a credible quality
commitment. The firm employing PF strategy delegates product quality positioning decision to in-
dividual customers. This characteristic of PF strategy provides the firm with the equivalent benefit
of postponement when there is demand uncertainty. For a monopolist, this benefit leads to the
same profit as that of a traditional firm who can postpone its quality decision until after the market
uncertainty is resolved. Likewise, in a duopoly setting, we numerically show that postponement
benefit of PF increases the profitability over and above the increase provided by its personalization
benefit. Furthermore, we find that the postponement benefit of PF is more valuable when demand
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exhibits more variability.
By employing an exhaustive numerical analysis covering the entire parameter space, we show
that PF strategy can be attractive even when it has a cost disadvantage. We find that it can tolerate
a higher cost disadvantage in bottom-heavy markets with relatively more price conscious customers.
However, when PF becomes cost competitive, it will be more valuable in top-heavy markets with
relatively more quality conscious customers. Through an extensive numerical study, we find that the
feasibility of partial PF strategy critically depends on the cost of 3D printing relative to traditional
production. Firstly, partial PF strategy can be beneficial only if a large enough proportion of the
product can be delegated for customer’s production. Secondly, the minimal required proportion
increases in the cost disadvantage of 3D printing. Therefore, if a firm could only delegate a small
proportion for customers’ production, it needs to wait for the 3D printing technology to mature and
become cost competitive. When the technology is cost competitive, we find that firms operating
in more bottom-heavy markets can successfully implement partial PF strategy with a smaller
delegated proportion. In contrast, the firms operating in more top-heavy markets need to delegate
higher proportion of the product to benefit from partial PF strategy.
2.1 Literature Review
There is a growing business literature about the new business models enabled by 3D printing and
the roadblocks for these business models (Piller et al., 2015). The rise of personal fabrication in the
recent years has been documented by Mota (2011) and Rayna and Striukova (2016) using descriptive
case research methods. However, prior to our work, the effectiveness of personal fabrication strategy
as a new business model and its critical roadblocks have not been rigorously studied using an
analytical framework.
Our work is related to the literature on product line design and mass customization. Product
line design problem has been widely studied in operations and marketing literature; we provide
a small sample of this literature here. Moorthy (1984) studies cannibalization and consumer self-
selection aspects of designing and pricing a product line. Netessine and Taylor (2007) study the
product line decisions of a monopolist while simultaneously considering operational issues such as
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inventory and batch sizing. Heese and Swaminathan (2006) study how product line decisions are
influenced by component commonality decisions. For a given product line, Lee and Tang (1997)
and Swaminathan and Tayur (1998) prescribe postponement and delayed differentiation as effi-
cient methods of delivering the product line to customers. This literature considers product line
design and manufacturing planning as decisions of the firm. On the contrary, a firm employing PF
strategy, delegates product positioning and manufacturing decisions to the customer. There is a
rich operations literature on mass customization (Mendelson and Parlaktürk, 2008a,b; Alptekinoğlu
and Corbett, 2008; Xia and Rajagopalan, 2009; Çil and Pangburn, 2017). In the mass customiza-
tion setting, the firm offers customized configurations of products; the product configurations are
completely realized (into a manufactured product) by the time of sale. This allows the firm to price
the product according to the chosen configuration. In contrast, in the PF setting, the product con-
figuration is not fully determined at the time of sale. Hence, while enabling product customization,
the firm cannot charge differential prices based on the realized configuration. This aspect differ-
entiates PF from the mass customization setting. For example, we find that the PF strategy does
not improve the profitability of the firm in monopoly setting in comparison to mass customization
that has been shown to improve the firm’s profitability (e.g., Mendelson and Parlaktürk 2008a).
Our work also contributes to customer co-creation/ co-production literature, as personal fab-
rication can be considered as a de-coupled form of co-production. In a traditional co-production
framework, customers and the firm work together, exchanging knowledge to co-create the product
or the service (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2004; Roels et al., 2010; Roels, 2014). While a firm
that engages in personal fabrication co-produces the product with the customer, their respective
decisions on the product are decoupled. The firm’s design and customers’ production decisions are
made independently. Moreover, most of the literature on co-production focuses on service settings.
Our work extends the customer co-production literature by studying the implications of decoupled
co-production in a product setting.
While our work is one of the first analytical modeling efforts on the impact of 3D printing
on product line choice and production delegation, there are papers that deal with other aspects.
Song and Zhang (2016) study the spare parts logistics decision in the presence of a 3D printing
alternative. They characterize when it is optimal to stock the part from a supplier, produce the
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part using a local 3D printer or adopt a hybrid approach. Westerweel et al. (2016) study if a
firm should use 3D printing or traditional manufacturing techniques for producing component
parts from the perspective of component reliability. Chen et al. (2017) study how 3D printing
can be effectively employed in a retail setting and its implications for supply chain coordination.
Different from these papers, our work focuses on a different influence of 3D printing on supply
chain management: personal fabrication and quality customization. Dong et al. (2016) also study
the impact of 3D printing technology on optimal assortments and product variety. They study
how a firm can incorporate 3D printing in its internal manufacturing setup. In contrast, our work
focuses on the case, where 3D printing is used by customers outside of the firm’s manufacturing
setup. Finally, different from all of the prior literature on 3D printing, our work considers research
questions about production delegation: under what situation PF strategy is profitable and how
much production should be delegated to customers?
2.2 Base Model: Personalization and Market Structure
In our model, customers vary in their willingness to pay for a quality attribute. Though we
consider a single quality attribute, it can be thought of as a combination of all the relevant quality
characteristics of a product (Moorthy, 1988; Heese and Swaminathan, 2006) such as the material
(plastic, bronze, steel etc.), surface finish and accuracy. In the base model, customer types θ are
uniformly distributed in the unit interval [0, 1] with unit total mass. In the subsequent sections,
we relax this assumption and consider a non-uniform distribution with demand uncertainty.
We consider two types of firms: traditional and personal fabrication (PF) firms. A traditional
firm designs and manufactures the product and therefore decides both price pt and quality qt. If a
customer of type θ buys the product from a traditional firm, she obtains the utility Ut(qt, pt; θ) =
θqt− pt. A PF firm only carries out product design and delegates the manufacturing responsibility
to the customer. A customer of type θ may purchase the product’s design from the PF firm
for a price pp and manufacture the product on her own, after choosing the quality level q
∗
c (θ)
that maximizes her utility. Pursuant to the vertical differentiation literature (e.g., Moorthy 1988,
Heese and Swaminathan 2006, Netessine and Taylor 2007) the cost of quality Cc(qc) is convex and
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increasing in quality level qc. Specifically, the customer’s manufacturing cost is q
2. Hence, the
utility obtained by type θ customer is given by the following maximization problem:
Up(pp; θ) = max
qc
(θqc − pp − q2c ) (2.1)
As the utility function in (2.1) is concave in qc, the optimum quality level is given by the first order
condition: q∗c =
θ
2 . Hence, type θ customer will obtain a utility of U
∗
p (pp; θ) =
θ2
4 − pp. Every
customer in the market either buys exactly one unit of the product or refrains from buying if none
of the products in the market yields a non-negative utility.
Remark 2.1.
∂U∗p (pp;θ)
∂θ > 0 and
∂Ut(qt,pt;θ)
∂θ > 0. Furthermore,
∂2U∗p (pp;θ)
∂θ2




Both PF and traditional firm provide a higher utility to a higher type customer. However, a
higher type customer receives increasingly higher utility from the PF firm, while that effect is not
present for a traditional firm. Therefore, the PF firm will be increasingly more attractive for higher
type customers (i.e., high valuation segment).
Let the demand generated for a product sold by the traditional firm with quality level qt
and price pt, be Dt(pt, qt). Similarly, the demand generated for a product design from PF firm
with price pp is given by Dp(pp). In our base model, customers and the firm have the same cost
structure: Cc(q) = Ct(q) = q
2. We study the implications of the cost disadvantage for 3D printing
in section 2.4.1. The traditional firm that chooses the quality qt and the price pt will make the
following profit:
Πt(qt, pt) = (pt − q2t )Dt(pt, qt) (2.2)
PF firm does not incur any marginal cost, as it is not producing the product. The PF firm that
chooses the price pp will make the following profit:
Πp(pp) = ppDp(pp) (2.3)
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Figure 2.1: Customer Utilities from PF Vs Traditional Monopoly
PF Firm
Traditional Firm




















2.2.1 PF Strategy for a Monopolist
We consider a niche market with a single firm. The following proposition shows that a mono-
polist may not benefit from the adoption of PF strategy.
Proposition 2.1. A PF monopolist earns the same profit as that of a traditional monopolist.
However, consumers obtain larger surplus from a PF monopolist.
All proofs are presented in the appendix.
The literature on strategic management indicates that some technological innovations and in-
novative business strategies—while creating value for customers—may fail to offer an improvement
in profits for the firm. The firm may not be able to extract the value created by the innovation
(Teece, 1986; Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996). Proposition 2.1 shows that this difficulty is present
in PF strategy as well. However, personalization enabled by the PF strategy creates additional value
to customers: customers with higher types (θ) receive increasingly higher utility from the PF firm
than the traditional firm as shown in Figure 2.1. In order for the firm to extract this additional
value created through personalization, it would need to charge the customer a customized price
based on the quality level chosen by her. However, the PF firm only sells product design and the
customer’s selection of their desired quality level happens after their purchase of the product’s
design. Therefore, the firm does not have the ability to extract the value created by PF strategy.
2.2.2 Competitive Value of Personalization Enabled by PF Strategy
In this section, we study the value of personalization offered by PF strategy in a competitive set-
ting. We first study the competition between two traditional firms as a benchmark (Section 2.2.2.1).
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Subsequently, we study how a PF firm would perform when competing against a traditional firm
(Section 2.2.2.2); contrasting those results with the benchmark helps us tease out the value of PF
strategy when competing against a traditional firm.
2.2.2.1 Benchmark: Competition Between Two Traditional Firms
We consider two traditional firms each offering a single product. The product of firm i is
characterized by its quality qi and price pi, where i = 1 or 2. The firms are symmetric in their cost
structure. The two firms first set their quality levels simultaneously and then they simultaneously
set their prices.
Proposition 2.2. When two traditional firms compete, the following results hold:
(i) In equilibrium (SPNE), one of the firms occupy the high quality position and the other firm
occupy the low quality position.
(ii) The firm that chooses higher quality level achieves a higher profit compared to the firm that
chooses lower quality level.
Proposition 2.2 shows that the high quality position is preferred by both firms. However,
because of symmetry, each firm can end up being a high or low quality firm. Hence, throughout
our discussion, we shall have two benchmarks: high quality benchmark and low quality benchmark.
2.2.2.2 PF Strategy for Competing against a Traditional Firm
We now model the competition between a PF firm (denoted by subscript p) and a traditional
firm (denoted by subscript t) using the following sequence of events: 1) traditional firm selects its
quality level 2) traditional firm decides its price as a Stackelberg leader and 3) PF firm decides
its price as a Stackelberg follower. There are two critical distinctions compared to the benchmark
competition. First, every customer θ, who buy from the PF firm selects their individual optimal
quality level. As a result, the first stage in this multi-stage game is not a quality game between
the two firms; instead, only the traditional firm chooses a quality level for its product at this stage.
The second distinction is in the firms’ pricing decisions. Compared to a traditional firm, a PF firm
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can react to the competitor’s price changes more quickly, as they are likely to operate as an internet
channel selling product designs (computer code), as opposed to physical products. Our Stackelberg
pricing model with the PF firm as the follower captures this relative pricing agility.
Proposition 2.3. In the competition between a PF firm and a traditional firm, there exists a
unique sub game perfect Nash equilibrium, where the PF firm captures the high end segment and
makes a higher profit compared to the traditional firm.
PF strategy enables the firm to capture the high end segment. On the other hand, in the com-
petition between two traditional firms, either firm can capture the high-end segment (Proposition
2.2). Comparing the equilibria profits characterized by Propositions 2.2 and 2.3, we obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 2.1. When competing against a traditional firm, adopting PF strategy always improves
profitability.
Corollary 2.1 establishes that adopting PF strategy is valuable when competing against another
traditional firm, irrespective of the type of benchmark (high or low quality benchmark).
2.2.2.3 Monopoly vs. Duopoly Comparison
Following Propositions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, we can plot the profit increment offered by the PF
strategy under different scenarios as shown in Figure 2.2. Personalization enabled by PF strategy
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consistently creates value for customers both in monopoly and duopoly settings. However, the firm
can appropriate this value only in the duopoly setting. The value of PF strategy increases even
further when the firm is in a more competitively disadvantageous position (low quality position in
the duopoly benchmark competition). We explain how PF strategy generates value in competition
using the notion of commitment.
Proposition 2.4. While competing against a traditional firm, a firm adopting PF strategy will
capture the same margin, demand and hence profit as that of a traditional firm that can credibly
commit to the monopoly optimal quality position.
Ability to commit to a quality level is valuable in the competition between two traditional firms.
It deters the competitor from choosing a higher quality level. However, making such a commitment
requires a credible commitment device. Proposition 2.4 shows that the PF strategy provides the
equivalent benefits of a credible commitment. When a firm adopts PF strategy, it delegates the
quality decision of its product to its customers. The quality level of the PF firm’s product for every
customer θ is always set at individually optimal quality level. Hence, a traditional firm competing
with a PF firm has no alternative other than to react to the PF firm’s implicit quality commitment.
However, without a competitor quality commitment is not useful. Therefore, PF strategy does not
improve profitability in a monopoly.
2.3 Skewed and Uncertain Demand
In this section, we study the impact of skewed demand distributions capturing the mix of
quality vs. price conscious customers. We introduce a trapezoidal demand distribution model
that parsimoniously captures this trade-off. We also generalize this model further to study what
happens when the firm is uncertain about this demand distribution.
2.3.1 Skewed Demand Model
We model the customers’ valuation for quality to be distributed according to a trapezoidal
distribution with the range of θ ∈ [0, 1]. The height of the trapezoid at the left extreme represents
the density of highly price conscious customers (θ = 0); we normalize this height to be 1. The
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Figure 2.3: Trapezoidal Distribution of Customers’ Types
(a) Bottom-Heavy Distribution (b = 0) (b) Top-Heavy Distribution (b = 1)
height of the trapezoid at the right extreme represents the density of highly quality conscious
customers (θ = 1) and is given by 1+3b2 ; the distribution parameter b ∈ [0, 1] indicates the relative
weight of quality conscious customers (high θ) compared to the price conscious customers (low













distribution studied in the previous section is a special case with b = 13 . The demand of a firm that
















Using this framework, we define two specific distributions called bottom-heavy distribution (FB)
where b = 0 and top-heavy distribution (FT ) where b = 1. FB has relatively higher density of price
conscious customers as shown in Figure 2.3a, where bottom end of the market is twice as dense as
the top end and. In contrast, FT has relatively higher density of quality conscious customers as
shown in Figure 2.3b, where top end of the market is twice as dense as the bottom end. In both
FB and FT scenarios, the maximum demand attainable by any firm is 1 as seen in (2.4).
Proposition 2.5.
i) The following statements hold for both FB and FT scenarios:
a) In a monopoly setting, PF strategy does not improve the profitability of the firm.
b) While competing against another traditional firm, PF strategy guarantees high quality posi-
tion and improves profitability.
ii) While competing against another traditional firm, PF strategy provides a higher profit incre-
ment in FT as compared to FB
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Part (i) of Proposition 2.5 basically generalizes Propositions 2.1 and 2.3. Part (ii) shows that
the magnitude of the profit increase from adopting PF depends on the customer distribution.
Specifically, it is higher in a top-heavy market — when there are more quality conscious customers.
This observation implies that firms that operate in a top-heavy market stands to gain more by
adopting PF strategy.
We have also conducted an exhaustive numerical analysis and studied the value of adopting PF
strategy under all possible customer distributions that lie between FB and FT i.e., b ∈ [0, 1]. We
used a step size of 0.01 in this study. As shown in Figure 2.4, we find that our insights continue to
hold for those intermediate customer type distributions as well.
2.3.2 Effect of Demand Uncertainty
In many settings, a firm may face uncertainty about the customer distribution: it may not
precisely know this distribution. We parsimoniously model this scenario as follows. In the first
period, both firms know that the customer distribution will be one of the two types Fb1 or Fb2 with
probability φ and 1−φ respectively. We consider b1 < b2 such that Fb2 is relatively more top-heavy
than Fb1 . At the start of the second period, this uncertainty is resolved and both firms know which
one of Fb1 or Fb2 represents the customer distribution.
A traditional firm needs to decide the product quality in the first period before the realization
of the customer distribution. This is justified because manufacturing planning depends on product
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Figure 2.5: Value of PF Strategy for a Monopolist Facing Demand Uncertainty
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quality and it has to be determined ahead of time. Both firms make price decisions after the
realization of the customer demand distribution. When they compete, similar to Section 2.2, PF
firm sets its price after traditional firm.
Lemma 2.1. A PF monopolist will make the same expected profit as that of a traditional monopolist
that can postpone the quality decision until after the realization of customer distribution uncertainty.
It is valuable for a traditional firm to postpone the quality decision until after the uncertainty
in customer distribution is resolved. However, such a postponement is often impractical, as the
product needs to be manufactured ahead of time. Lemma 2.1 shows that PF strategy provides
the equivalent benefit of postponing the product’s quality positioning decision. This leads to the
following result on the benefit of PF strategy for a monopolist facing demand uncertainty.
Proposition 2.6. PF strategy improves the profitability of a monopolist only when there is demand
uncertainty.
Proposition 2.6 states that as long as a monopolist faces some uncertainty about the customer
distribution, it can profit from PF strategy. Though a monopolist cannot extract value from
personalization offered by PF strategy, it can benefit from the postponement aspect when there
is demand uncertainty. Figure 2.5 shows this benefit is higher when there is more variability in
demand. The profit increase is higher when the two possible distributions are farther apart, that
is, when b2− b1 is larger. Furthermore, the profit increase has its peak around φ = 0.5, where both
types of markets are equally likely. This implies that adopting PF strategy provides a higher profit
increase when the firm faces more uncertainty about customer types.
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We are not able to obtain closed-form characterization of equilibria of duopoly scenarios when
demand exhibits uncertainty. Therefore, we conducted a numerical study that considered sev-
eral scenarios. Here, we present our findings for a representative set of scenarios: {b1, b2} ∈
{{0, 13}, {0,
2
3}, {0, 1}}. The insights that we generate from these examples carry over to all other
scenarios that we have studied.
We find that the benchmark (duopoly of two traditional firms) results are qualitatively similar
to those of the deterministic benchmarks (Proposition 2.2). Similar to Section 2.2, there can be two
benchmarks: high vs low quality benchmarks. The high quality firm makes a higher profit in the
duopoly of two traditional firms. Therefore, we will use high quality benchmark as a conservative
benchmark: the value of PF would be even higher compared to low quality benchmark. Let πUBM
show the profit of high quality benchmark.
In the competition between a PF and a traditional firm, we observe that the resulting equilib-
rium is unique, in which PF firm captures the higher valuation (high θ) segment and makes higher
expected profit (πUp ) compared to the traditional firm. In this case, PF strategy also improves
profitability by performing better than the benchmark: πUp > π
U
BM .
It would be helpful to tease out the value of PF due to demand uncertainty. Such a profit increase
quantifies the value of the postponement aspect of PF strategy, over and above the personalization
aspect. To characterize this profit increment, we introduce the following notation. We denote
the profit obtained by a PF firm in the deterministically known customer distribution Fb while
competing against a traditional firm as πbp. Likewise, for the same distribution, we denote the high
quality benchmark profit as πbBM . Thus, the expected profit increment specifically due to demand
uncertainty ∆UPF (b1, b2, φ) is given by:




















Profit improvement without demand uncertainty
(2.5)
This additional benefit accrues because the PF firm need not make product positioning decision
when they face uncertainty about customer distribution. However, the competing traditional firm
needs to make quality decision before uncertainty is resolved. The additional value of PF strategy is
higher when the two possible customer distributions are farther apart as can be seen in Figure 2.6. In
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Figure 2.6: Additional Value of PF Strategy Under Demand Uncertainty When Competing Against
a Traditional Firm
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this case, the traditional firm’s quality decision becomes more inefficient. This hurts the benchmark
profit, which leads to higher profit increment for PF strategy.
2.4 Technology Evolution and IP/Liability Concerns
We now study two extensions to our model. We first study what happens when PF has a
production cost disadvantage compared to traditional production. We then allow the firm to
implement a partial PF strategy that can mitigate the IP/liability concerns. We use the trapezoidal
customer distribution model of Section 2.3.1 in both of these extensions.
2.4.1 3D Printing’s Cost Disadvantage
Consider the case where 3D printing may have a production cost disadvantage compared to
the traditional manufacturing. Specifically, the customer’s production cost for a given quality level
q is ξq2, whereas the firms’ production cost is q2. In this cost structure, ξ represents the cost
disadvantage of 3D printing compared to traditional production. For example, a value of ξ = 2
means that 3D printing is twice as costly as traditional manufacturing.
After substituting her optimal quality choice, the customer’s utility for the PF product in (2.1)
reduces to: U∗p (pp; θ, ξ) = θ
2
4ξ −pp. With this model, we consider the competition between a PF firm
and a traditional firm. Though we cannot characterize the equilibrium in closed form as functions
of b and ξ, we can numerically characterize the equilibrium and we do an exhaustive numerical
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Figure 2.7: Profitability of PF Strategy in the Presence of a Cost Disadvantage
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study for the entire parameter space of b ∈ [0, 1] and ξ ∈ [1, 2].
One critical takeaway from our analysis is that the PF strategy can remain profitable even
under a cost disadvantage as seen in Figure 2.7. For example, at 5% cost disadvantage level, PF
strategy is beneficial for all customer type distributions. However, at 8% cost disadvantage level,
PF strategy is attractive only for more bottom-heavy distributions (b < 0.45). Figure 2.7b shows
the level of cost disadvantage PF strategy can tolerate for all possible parameters in our parameter
space b ∈ [0, 1]. We used the conservative benchmark (high quality traditional firm) in our analysis.
One might expect the PF strategy to tolerate a higher cost disadvantage in a more top-heavy
market (higher b), as it has a relatively higher density of quality conscious customers. Interestingly,
we find that 3D printing technology has to be very cost competitive for PF strategy to be profitable
in such markets. For example, when b = 1, the 3D printing’s technology’s cost disadvantage has to
be less than 6.3%. On the other hand, PF strategy remains profitable even at a cost disadvantage
of more than 10.6% when b=0, that is when the market is more bottom-heavy with a relatively
high density of price conscious customers.
An important feature of the PF strategy is its ability to capture the high end (more quality
sensitive) segment of the market, which results in a higher profit compared to the traditional firm.
PF strategy is able to capture the high-end segment because it provides increasingly higher utility to
customers with higher quality sensitivity (θ), as observed in Remark 2.1. Therefore, the traditional
firm can find it hard to compete for the high end of the market. However, when 3D printing has
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a high cost disadvantage, the traditional firm can increase the quality of its product because of
this competitive advantage. In top-heavy markets (higher b), the traditional firm finds it more
attractive to capture the high end. However, in a bottom-heavy market (lower b), the traditional
firm has a lesser incentive to capture the high end, thus allowing PF firm to stay at the high end.
This competitive dynamic enables PF strategy to be more profitable in bottom-heavy markets when
there is a high cost disadvantage for 3D printing.
In summary, technology and cost evolution of 3D printing can play an important role in de-
termining the kind of products/firms for which PF strategy will be profitable. When the cost
disadvantage of 3D printing is relatively high (as it arguably is currently), PF strategy can be suc-
cessfully employed by firms targeting bottom-heavy markets. Firms that want to target top-heavy
markets may need to wait for the 3D printing technology to mature further such that the cost
disadvantage becomes relatively small (6% in our study).
2.4.2 Addressing IP/Liability/Technology Restrictions: Partial PF Strategy
In this section, we study what happens when a firm delegates only a proportion of the product to
the customer. In this case, the customer gets access to the product design for a part of the product
and receives the rest as a pre-manufactured product. We refer to this business model as partial PF
strategy. A firm may adopt the partial PF strategy to mitigate concerns about intellectual property
(IP) (Desai and Magliocca, 2013) or product liability (Wang, 2016). In this context, we answer a
critical question: what is the minimal proportion of the product that needs to be delegated for this
strategy to be beneficial? We also study the impact of the production cost disadvantage and the
shape of customer type distribution (top vs bottom heavy) on this required delegation level.
A firm adopting partial PF strategy (hereafter referred as PPF firm) delegates the production
of d proportion of the product to customers, where 0 < d ≤ 1. PPF firm chooses the quality level
qp for the remainder of the product. The utility of a customer buying from the PPF firm is given
by:
Up(qp, pp; θ, ξ) = max
qc
θ(dqc + (1− d)qp)− pp − dξq2c (2.6)
Because each customer θ chooses q∗c =
θ
2ξ , her utility U
∗




ξ − 4qp) +
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4qp)− pp. The PPF firm manufactures (1−d) proportion of the product using traditional methods
at a cost of (1− d)q2p; it does not incur the cost penalty ξ like the customer.
We consider the competition between a PPF firm and a traditional firm, where PPF firm decides
the delegated proportion d first and then sets the quality level simultaneously with traditional firm.
The remaining events are same as before. Deriving the traditional firm’s optimal price in this game
requires finding the root of a sixth-degree polynomial and for that reason we cannot characterize
the equilibrium in closed form. However, we can numerically solve for the equilibrium. Hence,
we have conducted a numerical study to derive insights. Specifically, we conducted an exhaustive
numerical study and considered the entire parameter space of d ∈ [0, 1] and b ∈ [0, 1] and several
values of ξ. Figure 2.8 presents our findings for ξ = 0.95, 1.00 and 1.05. This set is representative
of many other ξ values that we explored. Figure 2.8 shows when PPF strategy can be profitable.
Specifically, for a given ξ, PPF is profitable when (b, d) pair is above the curve.
The competition between PPF firm and traditional firm may result in multiple equilibria. Both
PPF firm and traditional firm can capture high-end segment for a range of parameters. We say
that an equilibrium is Pareto dominated if there is another equilibrium that results in a higher
pay-off for both PPF and traditional firms. We drop any Pareto dominated equilibria from our
consideration.
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When PPF firm delegates a larger d proportion of the product two things can happen: customers
benefit more from personalization but the overall cost of PPF firm’s product can increase as PF
may have a higher cost than traditional production. Our numerical results show that when d is
sufficiently large the former dominates whereas when it is small the latter dominates.
Capturing the high-end segment is critical for profitability of PPF firm. Delegating a larger
proportion of the product ensures that PPF firm captures the high-end segment. Overall, a firm
can be assured to benefit from PPF strategy, only if delegates a large enough proportion of the
product. Moreover, whenever the partial PF is profitable, it is optimal to implement full PF by
delegating all production to customers. However, we recognize that IP and liability risks may limit
how much of the product can be delegated. Therefore, our results suggest that a firm can benefit
from PPF strategy, only if it can identify a large enough proportion of the product with manageable
IP/liability risks that can be delegated to customers. Furthermore, our results show that this critical
delegation proportion is determined by the cost difference between PF and traditional production








Similar to our observation in Remark 2.1, PPF strategy provides increasingly higher utility to
higher valuation customers as shown in Remark 2.2. Furthermore, delegating a larger proportion
d accentuates this benefit. In that case, the traditional firm prefers not to compete for high-end
segment and settles for the low-end segment, thereby ensuring that PPF firm captures the high-
end segment. In contrast, the cost disadvantage of PF weakens this benefit as seen in Remark 2.2.
This is because higher cost of PF lessens its personalization benefit as customers’ quality choices
depend on their manufacturing cost. To compensate for this effect, PPF firm needs to delegate
a higher proportion of the product. For example, under uniform distribution (b = 13), the firm
needs to delegate at least 64% of the product when there is no cost disadvantage, i.e., ξ = 1,
whereas it needs to delegate almost all of the product 99% when ξ increases to 1.05. In contrast,
it can be profitable with only 54% delegation when ξ = .95. Therefore, our results illustrate that
the feasibility of PPF strategy critically depends on the cost of 3D printing relative to traditional
production: if a firm could only delegate a small proportion of its product, it needs to wait for the
3D printing technology to mature and become cost competitive.
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Next, let us discuss the impact of customer distribution. Our numerical study shows that when
PF is cost competitive (ξ = 0.95 and 1.00) a top-heavy (more quality conscious) market requires a
higher proportion of the product to be delegated. As we discussed in Section 2.4.1, the traditional
firm has higher incentive to capture the high-end segment in a top-heavy market. Therefore, the
PPF firm can ensure capturing the high-end segment only if it can delegate a larger proportion d.
In contrast, PPF firm can ensure capturing the high-end with a substantially smaller delegation
in a bottom-heavy (more price conscious) market since the traditional firm has less incentive to
compete for the high-end segment in that case. Hence, our results suggest that the feasibility of
PPF strategy also depends on the firm’s targeted market type. Firms targeting a more bottom-
heavy market can manage IP/liability risks relatively easily by delegating a smaller proportion of
the product.
2.5 Conclusions
3D printing has been hailed as an enabler for the next industrial revolution and is expected
to change the way products are produced and delivered to customers (D’Aveni, 2013; Lipson and
Kurman, 2010). However, there are also cautioning voices that point out the limitations of this
technology (Holweg, 2015). Many firms are still exploring effective ways of utilizing this technology
in their business models. In a McKinsey survey of leading manufacturers, 40% of the respondents
were unfamiliar with 3D printing and were ill-prepared to identify its business opportunities (Cohen
et al., 2015a). In this context, our research provides timely insights that can help firms assess
attractiveness of the PF business model enabled by 3D printing. The discussion on PF in the
business press is often centered around its personalization benefits and the cost and IP/liability
concerns. Our work contributes to this debate by studying the interplay among these issues and
the market conditions such as competition, quality/price consciousness of the customer base and
demand uncertainty, and providing deeper insights on when PF might be a beneficial strategy.
We use a stylized model to study personalization and postponement benefits of PF strategy.
Our work shows that these benefits may critically depend on market conditions and we characterize
these relations. For example, while a monopolist may not extract the additional value created by
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PF enabled personalization, this additional value is helpful when competing against a traditional
firm.
The cost disadvantage of 3D printing relative to traditional production is often considered as
one of the key barriers to widespread adoption of PF. However, this cost gap is expected to shrink
over time following the advances in technology. Our findings show that the changes in this cost
gap will have an important implication on how PF can compete with traditional production: while
success of PF may be limited to more bottom-heavy markets when the cost gap is higher, reductions
in this cost gap can open up more top-heavy markets for PF as well.
PF brings IP risks and product liability concerns. Partial PF strategy may alleviate some of
these concerns. Interestingly, our work shows that the feasibility of partial PF strategy may also
hinge on the reduction in the cost disadvantage of PF relative to traditional production.
In addition to other benefits, PF strategy can help firms avoid setting up their own manufactur-
ing facilities. Therefore, start-up firms may find PF to be attractive primarily due to this savings
in fixed investment costs even when personalization and postponement benefits that we captured
in our model are not sufficiently high.
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CHAPTER 3: Personal Fabrication & Design Personalization: Value of
Enabling Customers to Tweak Product Designs
In this essay, we continue to explore the personal fabrication strategy. In the last chapter
we only considered the customer’s personalization of the product in the quality/vertical dimen-
sion. However, in some product settings, personalization in the horizontal/taste dimension may
be possible; in some settings, it could be the primary dimension of personalization. To handle
such scenarios, in this essay, we consider a more general setting for studying personal fabrication
allowing the customer to personalize the product in both the dimensions.
When a customer purchases a product’s design, she may personalize the product according
to her taste preferences (by tweaking the design), in addition to selecting the desired quality level
(quality customization studied in the first essay). Customizing the product’s design in the horizontal
dimension is generally considered to be difficult for an end customer, as it requires knowledge of
specialized software tools. However, these software tools are being made more easier and are
becoming widely used. Firms selling product designs through personal fabrication strategy have
also started assisting customers with horizontal personalization. Considering this scenario, we
study personal fabrication in 2 dimensions, where customer personalizes the product in both the
dimensions.
To model the 2 dimensional personalization enabled by personal fabrication, we propose a
cylindrical modeling framework. In our model, the circular dimension of the cylinder represents
customer’s horizontal (taste) preferences. The length dimension of the cylinder captures their
quality sensitivity. With this model, we study the value of personal fabrication in different market
structures and product line characteristics.
When personal fabrication enables personalization in both the dimensions, we find that the firm
can benefit in monopoly setting as well. We could see that this in contrast with the result obtained
when personalization is limited to quality dimension. In markets where customers do not value
horizontal personalization, personal fabrication strategy can still be profitable in monopoly setting,
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if there is uncertainty about the customers’ quality sensitivity. Personal fabrication strategy can
be profitable even if customers face a cost disadvantage of production. When the market has
stronger intensity for their taste (horizontal) preferences, PF strategy will be profitable under even
higher cost disadvantage levels. However, if the firm already has a product line of more than one
traditional products, value of adopting PF strategy decreases. We also show that our insights about
the partial PF strategy (to mitigate IP/liability concerns) discussed in the first essay carry over to
the generalized two dimensional model.
3.1 Literature Review
In our work, we extend the classical vertical differentiation (Tirole, 1988; Moorthy, 1988) and
horizontal differentiation frameworks (Hotelling, 1990; Salop, 1979) by incorporating production
delegation and personalization in both dimensions. Our work is related to the literature on mass
customization(Mendelson and Parlaktürk, 2008a,b; Corbett and Karmarkar, 2001). Our work also
contributes to customer co-creation/ co-production literature, as personal fabrication can be con-
sidered as a de-coupled form of co-production. Roels et al. (2010) study collaborative service
settings such as consulting or financial planning where the service provider and their customer
work together.
There is a growing literature on the practitioner journals about the influence of 3D printing
on supply chain: for example, Petrick and Simpson (2013) describes how 3D printing enables
distributed manufacturing, by moving manufacturing closer to the customer. Various business
models and the ecosystem that arise as part of the rapid growth in 3D printing are documented
by academic researchers in their position papers(Piller et al., 2015; Weller et al., 2014). Using
descriptive case research methods, the rise of personal fabrication in the recent years and the
reasons for its rise have been documented by Mota (2011) and Rayna and Striukova (2016).
Our work is also related to other analytical modeling works related to 3D printing(Song and
Zhang, 2016; Dong et al., 2016; Westerweel et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017), which were discussed in
more detail in the literature review of the earlier chapter (Section 2.1). However, to the best of our
knowledge, our work is the first to study two dimensional personalization enabled by delegating
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Figure 3.1: Cylindrical Market and Traditional Product Space
production to the customer.
3.2 Model: Personalization in Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions
In our model, customers are heterogeneous in two dimensions: in their willingness to pay for
quality θ and their ideal taste feature X . We consider a market where customers’ willingness to
pay for quality is either high type or low type: θ ∈ {θL, θH}. We consider the thickness of the
low type (θL) customers to be a, and the high type customers to be (1 − a). Customers’ ideal
taste features (horizontal) X are distributed uniformly on a circle with unit circumference. θ and
X considered together lead to a cylindrical distribution of customers (market model) with a unit
circumference Figure 3.1 a).
We consider two types of firms: traditional and personal fabrication (PF) firms. A traditional
firm designs and manufactures the product and therefore decides product positioning and price pt.
Product position is specified on a cylindrical surface: the product quality qt determines the height
and the product feature positioning is determined at the circumference of the cylinder at height qt.
A customer with a willingness to pay for quality θ, whose ideal taste feature is located x distance
away from the product offering (in the horizontal circular space as shown in Figure 3.1 b)), obtains
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the utility
Ut(qt, pt; θ) = θqt − tx− pt (3.1)
The term tx captures the mtisfit cost incurred by the customer for the deviation between her
ideal taste feature and the feature position of the traditional product, where t captures the taste
sensitivity of the market.
A PF firm only carries out product design and delegates the manufacturing responsibility to
the customer. PF firm only decides the price of the product pp. A customer of type θ may purchase
the product’s design from the PF firm for a price pp and manufacture the product after choosing
the quality level q∗c (θ) that maximizes her utility. Pursuant to the vertical differentiation literature
(e.g., Moorthy 1988, Heese and Swaminathan 2006, Netessine and Taylor 2007) the cost of quality
Cc(q) is convex and increasing in quality level q. Specifically, the customer’s manufacturing cost
is Cc(q) = q
2. As the customer has access to the product’s design, she may also correct for any
misfit in the product from her ideal taste feature. Hence, the utility obtained by customer θ, when
they buy a design from PF firm, personalize and manufacture the product is given by the following
maximization problem:
Up(pp; θ) = max
qc
(θqc − pp − q2c ) (3.2)
Let the demand generated for a product sold by the traditional firm with quality level qt and
price pt, be Dt(pt, qt). Similarly, the demand generated for a product design from PF firm with
price pp is given by Dp(pp). In our base model, customers and the firm have the same cost structure:
Cc(q) = Ct(q) = q
2. We study the implications of the cost disadvantage for 3D printing in a leter
section. The traditional firm that chooses the quality qt and the price pt will make the following
profit:
Πt(qt, pt) = (pt − q2t )Dt(pt, qt) (3.3)
PF firm does not incur any marginal cost, as it is not producing the product. The PF firm that
chooses the price pp will make the following profit:
Πp(pp) = ppDp(pp) (3.4)
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In the following sections, we shall analyze the value of offering a PF product while considering
a standard product as a benchmark.
3.3 Value of PF Strategy
We consider a niche product enjoying a monopoly market. To analyze the incremental value
offered by the PF strategy, we first establish the benchmark result of offering a standard product.
We then study how PF strategy could improve profitability compared to this benchmark.
Proposition 3.1. In a monopoly market, when the firm offers a standard product:
 If t = 0, πBMm =

θ2H





 If t > 0, πBMm =

(−aθH+aθL+θH)4




−3a2θ2H + 6a2θHθL − 3a2θ2L + 2aθ2H − 2aθHθL + θ2H
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)
and 3θH−4θL3θH−3θL > a
(1−a)(θ2H−2t)




−3a2θ2H + 6a2θHθL − 3a2θ2L + 2aθ2H − 2aθHθL + θ2H
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Proposition 3.1 shows the traditional firm’s profit in the two dimensional market space. The
different conditions in the expression represent scenarios where the market is covered or not covered
in the horizontal dimension for the low and high valuation segments.
Proposition 3.2. In a monopoly market, when the firm offers a PF product, they will make the
following profit: πm =

θ2H





Proposition 3.2 shows the profit attained by the PF firm in the two dimensional market. One
can note that the intensity of customer’s taste preferences t does not feature in this expression.
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This is because the customers who buy from the PF firm can completely personalize the design
before getting it 3D printed - hence incur zero disutility for taste mismatch.
Corollary 3.1. When t = 0, πm = π
BM





Profitability improvement offered by the PF strategy is summarized by Corollary 3.1. One
can note that the profitability improvement critically depends on the intensity of customer’s taste
preferences t. When t = 0, we essentially have a market that only cares about the quality/vertical
dimension. In that case our result is not surprising, as it is similar to what we discussed already in
Chapter 2. However, if the market cares about taste mismatch t > 0, then we can see that the PF
strategy provides profitability improvement. More importantly, we see that the profit improvement
increases when the customers intensity of taste preferences t increase.
3.3.1 Effect of Demand Uncertainty
In the previous section, we saw that the profitability of PF strategy for a monopolist depends
on customers’ intensity of preferences, when the firm can observe the thickness of high and low
type customer segments. In this section, we ask the same of question of PF’s profitability when the
firm cannot deterministically observe the size of customer segments (a). Specifically we consider
a scenario where the firm has to make its quality decision without deterministically knowing the
size of hight (low) type customer segment. Many firms face such a scenario in real life. We show
the result and conduct the discussion for the case where t = 0, as in this case, PF strategy did not
improve profits in the deterministic case; we plan to contrast the new results from that. However,
we later will discuss if and how this result will change when t > 0.
We assume that the firm faces uncertainty of the following form about segment thickness:
a ∈ {a1, a2} such that Pr(a = a1) = φ and Pr(a = a2) = (1−φ), where a1 < a2. Following are the
specific sequence of events when the firm sells a standard product: 1) while facing uncertainty about
the segment sizes, firm decides the product’s quality level 2) uncertainty is resolved, and 3) the
firm makes the pricing decision. We assume that the quality decision is made ahead of uncertainty
resolution, as it tends to be a strategic decision which cannot be quickly modified: quality decision
typically involves change in raw material and/or manufacturing technology and assembly. On the
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other hand, pricing decision is more tactical, and often can be changed by firms more dynamically
- hence, we assume that it is made after uncertainty resolution. Having established the benchmark
traditional firm, we now study how a PF product can improve profitability. For the PF product,
firm only needs to make the pricing decision. Similar to the traditional product, the firm makes
the pricing decision after the uncertainty is resolved, as it is tactical.
Proposition 3.3. When a firm faces uncertainty about segment thickness (a ∈ {a1, a2} : Pr(a =
a1) = φ and Pr(a = a2) = (1−φ), where a1 < a2), PF strategy is more profitable than a traditional
product if and only if a1 < 1−
θ2L
θ2H




Under this uncertainty setting, PF firm (and its customers) has an advantage over the traditional
firm as it does not have to make any decisions while facing the uncertainty. However, Proposition
3.3 states that the PF strategy will benefit from this scenario if and only if the uncertainty is large
enough to impact the decision making of the traditional firm. From Proposition 3.1 and Proposition
3.3 and their proofs, we can see that the effective quality level received by the market under optimal




. When the uncertainty
is large enough, the two possible segment thicknesses — a1 and a2 — are on either side of the
threshold, which implies that the traditional product will lose some profit in expectation because
of uncertainty. Hence, the PF strategy can add value even when t = 0, as long as the firm faces
a large enough uncertainty about segment thickness. When t > 0, the intuition continues to hold.
In this case, PF strategy benefits from both thee uncertainty (if it is large enough), and from the
personalization in the horizontal dimension.
3.4 Cost Disadvantage of PF Strategy & Intellectual Property (IP) Concerns
While providing benefits of personalization, PF strategy is not without its road blocks. 3D
printing is often more expensive than traditional mass production for producing the product. Hence
the PF strategy (customer’s production) faces a cost disadvantage. As the product’s design is sold
to the customers, the strategy also faces intellectual property risks; firms may not want to engage
in this strategy for the fear of exposing their IP. In this section, we consider these roadblocks and
discuss how it impacts the PF strategy, and what could be done to mitigate them.
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3.4.1 Impact of Cost Disadvantage for PF strategy
In this section, we model the scenario where the customer’s production in PF strategy faces a
cost disadvantage in comparison’s to traditional product’s production. Specifically customers’ cost
of production = βq2, and the firm’s cost of production = q2, where β ≥ 1.
Proposition 3.4. PF strategy can be profitable even with a cost disadvantage factor β ≥ 1, as long
as β ≤ β∗(t, θL, θH , a). Also, β∗(t, θL, θH , a) increases in t.
Proposition 3.4 shows that the cost disadvantage can be mitigated by the removal of horizontal
disutility. We also can see that a larger cost disadvantage can be sustained when the market has
higher intensity of taste preferences.
3.4.2 Partial PF to Mitigate IP Issues
To mitigate the impact of IP issues, firms may employ partial PF strategy: the firm will delegate
the production of a proportion of the product d to the customer and manufacture the rest of the
product ((1 − d) proportion) themselves. In this way, the firm could keep the amount of product
and in effect IP exposed to the customers. In this section, we explore the effectiveness of employing
such a strategy. In this case, the PF firm customers’ utility function and the firm’s profit function
changes to:
Up(pp; θ) = max
qc
(θ(dqc + (1− d)qp)− pp − (1− d)xt− dβq2c ) (3.5)
Πp(pp) = (pp − (1− d)q2p)Dp(pp) (3.6)
For analyzing this case, we focus specifically on the parametric conditions, where at optimality,
a traditional product will attract both low and high segment customers and will not cover either of
the segments. This condition translates to the following condition (as shown in Proposition 3.1):
t ≥ 14
(
−3a2θ2H + 6a2θHθL − 3a2θ2L + 2aθ2H − 2aθHθL + θ2H
)
and 3θH−4θL3θH−3θL ≤ a. The qualitative
insights we present here holds on other parametric conditions as well.
Proposition 3.5. If the firm doses not have any IP restrictions, d∗ ∈ {0, 1}. When β = 1, firm
benefits from PF strategy for any d ∈ (0, 1). When β > 1, for the firm to benefit from PF strategy,
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we need: d > d#(θL, θH , a, β).
First takeaway from Proposition 3.5 is that it is optimal to either delegate the whole product
to the customer or not delegate at all (act as a standard product). However, this result assumes
that the firm does not have any IP related restrictions (which are not explicitly modeled here).
When they do have IP restrictions, they may be wiling to delegate only a smaller proportion of
the product that they deem to be of lesser/manageable IP risk. In this context, it is critical to
understand if d ∈ (0, 1) can be beneficial to the firm (i.e., lead to better profit than the traditional
product). We find that PF strategy can be profitable for d ∈ (0, 1), if there is no cost disadvantage
for PF. If there is some cost disadvantage, then the delegation level must be higher than a critical
threshold delegation.
3.5 Conclusions
In this essay, we show how the adoption of personal fabrication can be increased significantly if
the customers’ ability to personalize the product in the horizontal dimension is improved. Horizontal
personalization involves tweaking of the product design, which is considered more difficult for end
customers, as it needs some knowledge of special CAD tools (Schmidt and Ratto, 2013). However,
there are rapid improvements currently as more and more product design tools aimed at the end
customer are being released. Moreover, many designers who sell their product through personal
fabrication strategy are offering design customization web tools to enable personalization by end
customers. Our work in this chapter highlights the value of enabling horizontal personalization.
We study the personal fabrication strategy in a more general setting allowing for horizontal
personalization as well with a focus on monopoly markets. When personal fabrication enables
personalization in both the dimensions, we find that the firm can benefit in monopoly setting as
well. In markets where customers do not value horizontal personalization, personal fabrication
strategy can still be profitable in monopoly setting, if there is uncertainty about the customers’
quality sensitivity. Personal fabrication strategy can be profitable even if customers face a cost
disadvantage of production. When the market has stronger intensity for their taste (horizontal)
preferences, PF strategy will be profitable under even higher cost disadvantage levels. However,
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if the firm already has a product line of more than one traditional products, value of adopting
PF strategy decreases. We also show that our insights about the partial PF strategy (to mitigate
IP/liability concerns) discussed in the first essay carry over to the generalized two dimensional
model.
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CHAPTER 4: Delegating Production to the Retail Stores: Influence of
Channel Structure and Buzz Effect on In-store 3D Printing
In this essay, we focus on using 3D printing technology effectively at a retail location to offer
customized products on demand. 3D printing enables manufacturing to be moved to retail stores
near customers. In a recent survey of European retail leaders commissioned by Ricoh Europe,
68% of those surveyed plan on investing in 3D printing technologies within the next two years.
Many firms in the consumer goods industry are exploring the possibility of 3D printing at the retail
stores. For example, Adidas has unveiled a new concept product Futurecraft 3D, where the insole
of the shoe will be 3D printed in-store meeting the exact customer specifications (Strange, 2015).
Ministry of Supply — an apparel company — lets customers customize the design and color of
the garment, and 3D prints the garment in 90 minutes using an in-store 3D printer (Kestenbaum,
2017). European fashion retail chain Eram prints personalized shoes in store (Roberson, 2017). The
trend is present in the chocolate and food industry as well: for example, Hershey is personalizing
chocolate designs and prints for their customers in its headquarters (Porter, 2015).
Retail location 3D printing benefits the supply chain by providing better product customization.
It also creates a buzz effect and increases the overall store demand, leading to positive externalities
for the firms’ standard product line (Trinh, 2017; Vitone, 2016). While offering fit and/or buzz
related benefits to the firm, retail 3D printing poses many challenges as well. As the manufacturing
of the product now happens at the store, customer wait times need to be carefully managed. 3D
printers are lumpy capacity investments to be incurred by the supply chain. The manufacturer
needs to decide how much of the product should be manufactured at the retail location and how
much of it should be pre-made. The retailer needs to decide the amount of investment they make
in a 3D printer.
We propose a novel modeling framework to capture delegated customization and the supply
chain dynamics in the presence of production delegation. Among others, we capture two key at-
tributes of in-store 3D printing: retail store congestion due to customers’ wait times and buzz effect.
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We study the effectiveness of in-store 3D printing under different channel structures (centralized
vs decentralized), different market characteristics (niche vs saturated), and product characteristics.
Using our results, we highlight the settings where the strategy can be profitably employed.
In our model, we consider a customer population that is heterogeneous in their taste preferences.
Customers are also sensitive to the time that they have to wait for 3D printing the product. We
consider a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. Manufacturer delegates a
proportion of the product to the retailer, for customizing and manufacturing at the retail location.
The manufacturer produces the rest of the product. The retailer makes a capacity investment in
3D printing setup. We model the 3D printing process as a make-to-order queue: the service rate is
influenced by the 3D printing investment level and the delegated product.
In a centralized channel, adoption of 3D printing depends on the investment cost of 3D printer
and product design cost of delegation. In-store 3D printing can be profitable in both niche and
saturated markets. Even when these costs are low, as long as there is some non-negative investment
cost, the channel will also offer a standard product line alongside the 3D product. If the centralized
channel offers a competitor’s standard product as well, investment cost threshold for in-store 3D
printing will be lower. In other words, 3D printing is less likely to be adopted. However, when the
investment costs are indeed low, the channel may offer a fully customized 3D product and will stop
selling the competitor’s product altogether.
In decentralized channel, adoption of in-store 3D printing critically depends on market satur-
ation. In-store 3D printing will not be adopted in saturated markets even if the 3D printer can
be purchased at no cost to the retailer. However, in niche markets, in-store 3D printing will be
adopted if the costs are low enough. If the decentralized channel offers a competitor’s product at
the retail level, in-store 3D printing will not be adopted: the manufacturer will not find it profit-
able. However, if there is a strong enough buzz effect and/or a large enough quality advantage for




Retail 3D printing can be thought of as a way of postponing production. There is a signific-
ant amount of literature on production and product postponement (Swaminathan and Lee (2003)
provide a comprehensive overview of the literature). Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) study different
types of postponement strategies— such as production and price postponement— and their relative
effectiveness. Anand and Girotra (2007) and Anupindi and Jiang (2008) study the postponement
decision and its strategic implications under competition. However, most of this literature study
postponement and variety related decisions, as made by a single firm in a centralized manner. In
our setting, the amount of product produced at a retail store and the resulting customization are
driven by self interested decisions of manufacturer and retailer.
In our problem setup, we allow the proportion of the product that is 3D printed at the retail
store to be customized. Hence, our work is related to the rich operations and marketing literature on
customization (Dewan et al., 2003; Syam and Kumar, 2006; Mendelson and Parlaktürk, 2008a,b;
Alptekinoğlu and Corbett, 2008; Xia and Rajagopalan, 2009; Çil and Pangburn, 2017). Mass
customization literature considers customized products and standard products offered by a firm
and focus on the optimal configuration of standard and custom products in monopoly and/or
duopoly setting. Our work contributes to this literature by considering two unique aspects of
offering customized products using retail 3D printing: i) customization level and the lead time
for customization are no longer decided by a single (centralized) firm, but are results of multiple
decisions made by manufacturer and the retailer and ii) offering in-store 3D printing has a positive
demand externality effect on the standard product line.
Our work is also related to a stream of literature in marketing and operations that studies the
product line design problem in a decentralized channel setting. Villas-Boas (1998) studies a mono-
poly manufacturer who distributes two vertically differentiated products to competing retailers.
Shao et al. (2013) consider two horizontally differentiated products distributed through the supply
chain facing stochastic demand. Liu and Cui (2009) study the product line extension problem of
a horizontally differentiated product line in the decentralized channel setting. This stream of liter-
ature does not consider customized products. Our work contributes to this literature by studying
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customized products along with standard products in a decentralized channel setting.
Our work contributes to the emerging literature which studies the operational implications of
3D printing in an analytical modeling framework. Song and Zhang (2016) study the spare parts
logistics decision in the presence of a 3D printing alternative. They characterize when it is optimal
to stock the part from a supplier, produce the part using a local 3D printer or adopt a hybrid
approach. Westerweel et al. (2016) study if a firm should use 3D printing or traditional manu-
facturing techniques for producing component parts from the perspective of component reliability.
Dong et al. (2016) study the impact of 3D printing technology on optimal assortments and product
variety. Different from these works, we study the problem of delegated customization and provide
insights about retail 3D printing.
Similar to our work, Chen et al. (2017) and Arbabian and Wagner (2017) also study the im-
plications of 3D printing the product at a retail establishment. Chen et al. (2017) explore the
application of 3D printing on online and/or in-store channels. Their work focuses on cross-channel
implications of employing 3D printing as a replacement for traditional manufacturing. Arbabian
and Wagner (2017) focus on the trade-off between the capacity investment cost for 3D printing
and the ability of 3D printing technology to react to stochastic demand. Considering this trade-off,
they characterize the conditions under which the retailer may adopt 3D printing. Compared to
these two papers, we take a more fine-grained approach, allowing for a proportion of the product
to be 3D printed and the rest manufactured traditionally. This allows for a partial customization,
as decided by the supply chain partners. We also explicitly consider the impact of in-store waiting
time for 3D printing, as this can be as long as 90 minutes to a few hours depending on the type
of 3D printer and the product. In addition, we consider another potentially important reason for
3D printing implementation in the retail store: the buzz effect which increases the footfall to the
retail store and provides a positive demand externality to the firm’s standard (non- 3D printed)
products.
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Figure 4.1: Standard and 3D products
4.2 Model
We consider a market where customers are heterogeneous in terms of a taste attribute. We use
Salop’s circular city model to describe customers’ heterogeneity in the taste attribute (Salop, 1979;
Balasubramanian, 1998). Customers are distributed uniformly on a circle of unit circumference;
their locations represent their ideal products. Each customer may buy at most one product. Cus-
tomers are sensitive to waiting time. We assume that customers are homogeneous in their waiting
time sensitivity and their sensitivity is threshold based: customers are willing to wait for T units
of time in the store for the product to be available without any utility loss and will get zero utility
if their waiting time is more than T .
4.2.1 Standard and 3D Products
The supply chain can potentially sell two types of products to the customers: a standard product
and a 3D product. A standard product is manufactured completely by the manufacturer and stored
in the inventory of the retailer for immediate purchase by the customer. A standard product S is
represented by a point in the circumference of the circular market model as shown in Figure 4.1. A
customer who is positioned at a circumferential distance of x from S incurs a preference mismatch
disutility of tx, where t represents the customers’ taste mismatch sensitivity in a given market.
Hence, the utility derived by a customer positioned at a circumferential distance of x from S when
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the retail price of S is ps, is given by:
Us(ps;x) = R− ps − tx (4.1)
sx and s̄x are the customers who are indifferent between purchasing the standard product S and
not purchasing the product: Us(ps; sx − S) = Us(ps; s̄x − S) = 0.
A 3D product, if both the manufacturer and the retailer decide to offer, will not be completely
manufactured by the manufacturer. Manufacturer lets the retailer customize and 3D print the γ ∈
(0, 1] proportion of the product on-demand at the retail location; manufacturer only manufactures
(1−γ) proportion of the product and ships it to the retailer. A 3D product’s position in the circular
market model is characterized by two parameters: the delegated proportion of the product γ and
the core product D. One can think of the 3D product as the standard product positioned at D,
with a γ proportion of it yet to be made. Once the customer decides to purchase a 3D product,
γ proportion of the product will be perfectly customized to customer’s specifications. Because of
this dynamic, a customer located at x distance away from the 3D product’s core incurs a taste
mismatch disutility of tx(1 − γ). Hence, the utility derived by a customer located at x distance
from D for buying a 3D product {D, γ} with a retail price of pd is given by:
Ud(γ, pd;x) = R− pd − tx(1− γ) (4.2)
One can easily see that customers buying the 3D product will receive a completely customized
product if γ = 1, and receive a utility of R− pd irrespective of their location in the market.
4.2.2 3D Printing Queue and Costs
We study different supply chain configurations in the paper involving a manufacturer and a
retailer: centralized (manufacturer and retailer are operated by the same firm) and decentralized
(manufacturer and retailer are independent entities). When both manufacturer and the retailer
agree on offering a 3D product, an investment needs to be incurred for the 3D printer installation
at the retail store. 3D printers are available at different production rates - faster printers are more
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expensive than the slower ones. We assume that this investment cost to be linear in the production
rate of the printer Mµ. Though one may argue that a functional form that is convex in production
rate µ may be more realistic, we keep the linear functional form for tractability of analytical results.
We plan to carryout numerical robustness analysis with a convex functional form in the future.
When a firm delegates a proportion of the product, the firm incurs additional costs related
to product design. Firm needs to design the product such that the delegated proportion of the
product is perfectly customizable, and it integrates seamlessly with the core. We capture this design
investment cost through the term kγ2. Convex functional form of this cost captures the increasing
difficulties of higher delegation. However, all our core results about the hurdles of decentralized
retail 3D printing go through even if we assume a linear functional form kγ, or if we assume this
cost to be zero. We assume that the production cost (c) of 3D printing the product is the same as
manufacturer’s production cost. Our core results go through even if we assume that retailer’s 3D
printing production costs are higher compared to manufacturer’s production cost. We make the
simplifying assumption of equal costs in our paper, to keep the model parsimonious and improve
the clarity of results.
3D printing at the retail location imposes a waiting time on customers buying the 3D product
and leads to a congestion effect. We capture the congestion effect by modeling the 3D printing
process as an M/M/1 queue. All the customers arrive to the store in a Poisson process with unit
arrival rate (Note: We assume unit arrival rate for keeping the model parsimonious. All our
insights go through, even if we consider an exogenously given arrival rate of λ ). For a given retail
price of the 3D product pd, let the proportion of customers who obtain positive and higher utility
Ud(γ, pd;x) than any other product alternative be Dd. Now the effective arrival rate to the 3D
printing queue is given by Dd. A 3D printer with an exponential production rate µ can produce
µ full products per unit time. However, as only γ proportion of the product is delegated by the
manufacturer for retail production, the effective production rate for a 3D product {D, γ} is given
by µγ . When the delegation is very small γ → 0, the printer can produce the product very quickly
and will take µ units of time if γ = 1. With this formulation, the total waiting time of customers
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for getting the product 3D printed is given by:




4.2.3 Buzz Effect and Demand Externality of 3D Printing at Retail Store
3D printing at the retail store not only enables better fit for the customers buying the 3D
product. It also creates a buzz effect and increases the customer arrival rate (additional footfall)
to the store, leading to positive externalities for the firms’ standard product line as well. We
model this demand externality through increase in the arrival rate of customers to the store. When
both the manufacturer and retailer agree on offering 3D product, manufacturer also decides the
proportion of the product γ that will be 3D printed at the store. We assume that the proportion
of the product 3D printed at the retail store is proportional to the amount of buzz effect. This
assumption is justified because, if a larger proportion of the product is being 3D printed, it may
need more floor space in the store and more buzz around it. Customers are more likely to notice
when a large proportion is 3D printed vs a small part of the product is 3D printed.
Concretely, we model the buzz effect as follows: the demand arrival rate to the store (which
was originally 1) increases to (1 + kγ), where k is buzz factor, a parameter that represents the
type of product market. In some industries and products k may be large and in others it may be
negligible.
The buzz effect of 3D printing also affects the customers waiting time. Increasing the proportion
3D printed at the store (γ) not only decreases the effective production rate of the printer, it also
increases the arrival rate of customers through the buzz effect. Hence the new expression for waiting
time which includes the buzz effect is given by:
W (pd, µ, γ) =
γ
µ− (1 + kγ)Ddγ
(4.4)
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4.2.4 Product Line Composition and the Benchmark
We consider a supply chain that currently offers 2 standard products located evenly around
(diametrically opposite) the circumference of the circular market (Note: It is established in the
literature that such an equal spaced placement of standard products is at least one of the possible
equilibria in the circular city model(Dewan et al., 2003; Balasubramanian, 1998)). With that being
the benchmark setup, we study if the supply chain would replace one of the standard products with
a 3D product. This setup yields a tractable and parsimonious model to capture various nuances
of offering a 3D product alongside an existing standard product lineup in different supply chain
configurations and competitive conditions.
4.3 Centralized Channel
We first model the setting where the retail store is owned and operated by the manufacturer.
We start with this analysis as this is one of the common implementations of retail 3D printing
at present (Kestenbaum, 2017; Roberson, 2017). We start by establishing benchmark results of
offering two standard products in a centralized channel.
Proposition 4.1. In a centralized channel, when the firm offers 2 standard products:











In our subsequent analysis and discussion of results, we differentiate the market as a niche
vs standard market. We define niche market as a market in which some customers do not buy
any product offering in the equilibrium : market remains uncovered. In the case of centralized
channel offering two standard products (Proposition 4.1), such a market is characterized by the
condition (R − c) < t2 . In these markets, customers care a lot more about taste mismatch while
having relatively low valuation for the product. We define standard market as a market where
all customers buy some product offering in the equilibrium. For the centralized channel with
two standard products, such a market will be characterized by the condition (R − c) ≥ t2 . In
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these markets, customers have high valuation for the product and relatively low disutility for taste
mismatch.
In the following analysis, we study if one of the two standard products can be profitably replaced
by a 3D product. We can formulate the profit function of the centralized channel that offers a 3D
product alongside a standard product as follows:
max
ps,pd,µ,γ






In the above formulation, Ds and Dd represents demands generated by the standard product
and 3D product respectively. The 3D printer investment cost is represented by Mµ, whereas the
term kγ2 represents the product design cost of delegation. The constraint represents the congestion
dynamic, and ensures that the expected customer wait time is less than or equal to their waiting
time threshold (T ) of the customer population. With this formulation, we study the optimal
decisions of the firm.
In many cases, the kind of product and technical limitations of 3D printing dictate the propor-
tion of the product that can be 3D printed at the retail store. Hence, we first study the optimal
3D printer investment decision (µ∗) for any exogenously given delegated product proportion (γ)
for retail 3D printing.
Proposition 4.2. In a centralized channel, for any amount of delegation γ
 If (R− c) < t2 and γ <
2c−2R+t
c−M−R+t
– Market remains uncovered









if M ≤ R−cγ
0 o/w
 If (R− c) ≥ t2 or γ ≥
2c−2R+t
c−M−R+t
– Market is covered









if M ≤ tγ
0 o/w
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Proposition 4.2 highlights that as long as the 3D printer investment cost (M) is sufficiently
small, a centralized channel will benefit from retail 3D printing in both niche and standard markets.
Hence, under these conditions, the channel will replace one of the standard products and offer a
3D product through retail 3D printing.
Corollary 4.1. 3D product would cover the maximum possible market segment, when γ = 1, and
the market segment is given by t−Mt .
It is also useful to examine if there are conditions, where it is optimal to replace both the
standard products with a single 3D product. Proposition 4.1 highlights that even when the whole
product is delegated for retail 3D printing, and hence perfectly customized, it is optimal to offer
a standard product alongside the 3D product. 3D product will not cover the entire market, as
t−M
t < 1, ∀M > 0.
Proposition 4.3. ∃ conditions on {M,T, k, t} such that γ∗(M,T, k, t) > 0. If the product design
cost of delegation is small enough (k < (t−2M)
2
16t ), then γ
∗ ∈ {0, 1}. If the product design cost of
delegation is larger (k ≥ (t−2M)
2
16t ), then γ
∗ ∈ [0, 1).
A key takeaway from Proposition 4.3 is that there exists conditions on {M,T, k, t} such that it is
optimal for the firm to delegate a positive proportion of the product for retail 3D printing. Whether
the entire product or only a proportion of it is 3D printed in-store depends on the relationship
between the product design cost of delegation (k), 3D printer investment cost (M). and the
customers’ intensity for taste preference (t). If the firm can create a fully customizable and 3D
printable product design with minimal design cost, the product will be either completely 3D printed
in-store, or not offered as a 3D product at all. On the other hand, if the firm needs to incur a
significant design investment, firm may only offer a partially 3D printed product.
4.3.1 Impact of Selling a Competing Standard Product at the Retail Store
Many apparel, jewelry, and footwear retailers sell their own store-branded items alongside other
brands. In this case the retailer essentially operates a centralized channel for their product, while
also selling the competitor’s product at the retail level. These product categories are well positioned
for retail 3D printing. Eram — a fashion retailer from Europe — is already experimenting with
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3D printing their own branded footwear (Roberson, 2017), while also selling products from other
brands at the store.
In this section, we capture this scenario by considering a centralized channel selling their own
standard product and a competitor’s standard product at the retail level. We explore if the channel
would replace their standard product with a 3D product and the impact of 3D product on the
competitor’s standard product. Throughout this section, we assume that the product’s valuation
(R) is sufficiently high compared to the customer’s intensity of preferences (t) : specifically (R−c) ≥
2
3 t. This assumption ensures that the two products compete for market share and do not act as dual
monopolies. In the following proposition, we establish the benchmark results of offering standard
products at the retail store. In establishing this benchmark, we assume that the competitor decides
their product’s wholesale price first, which is followed by retail price decisions by the firm.
Proposition 4.4. In a centralized channel, when the firm offers its standard product and a standard
product from a competitor at the retail store, the firm will capture 34
th
of the market, and will make




of the market, and will make a profit of t8 .
We now explore if the centralized channel can benefit from changing their standard product
to a 3D product. We consider the following sequence of events: the firm decides the delegated
proportion, and then 3D printer investment, followed by the competitor’s decision of their product’s
wholesale price, and finally the retail price decisions of the firm. Similar to our analysis in the earlier
section, we first study the optimal 3D printer investment decision (µ∗) for any exogenously given
delegated product proportion (γ) for retail 3D printing.
Proposition 4.5. For a given γ, the firm will introduce the 3D product in place of their standard
product iff M ≤ −16γ
2kT+32γkT+6γtT−13tT
16γ+8γT−24T−32 . If they introduce the 3D product, they will invest in a
3D printer with speed µ∗ = γT +
(3−γ)γ
2(2−γ) , and capture a market of
(3−γ)
2(2−γ) .
Proposition 4.5 highlights that as long as the 3D printer investment cost (M) is sufficiently
small, a centralized channel will benefit from retail 3D printing even when they sell a competitor’s
product as well.







, compared to the case without competition (M ≤ tγ ).
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Corollary 4.3. 3D product would cover the entire market, when γ = 1 and the 3D printer invest-
ment cost is low enough M ≤ −16γ
2kT+32γkT+6γtT−13tT
16γ+8γT−24T−32 .
Though the centralized channel can benefit from 3D product even in the presence of competition,
the investment cost factor (M) faces a tighter adoption threshold compared to the case without com-








the firm implement 3D product only if they don’t sell the competitor’s product in their retail
channel. On the other hand, when the investment cost factor is low enough, Corollary 4.3 shows
that the 3D product will cover the entire market, if the product is fully customizable (γ = 1); the
retailer will stop offering the standard product from the competitor.
Proposition 4.6. ∃ conditions on {M,T, k, t} such that γ∗(M,T, k, t) > 0. If the product design
cost of delegation is small enough (k < (t−8M)64 ), then γ
∗ ∈ {0, 1}. If the product design cost of
delegation is larger (k ≥ (t−8M)64 ), then γ
∗ ∈ [0, 1).
Similar to the non-competitive case (Proposition 4.3), there exists conditions on {M,T, k, t} such
that the centralized channel will delegate a positive proportion of the product for retail 3D printing
even when they sell a competitor’s standard product (Proposition 4.6). Considering Proposition
4.6 and Corollary 4.3 together, when the product design cost of delegation (k) and the 3D printer
investment cost (M) is low, the firm may delegate the entire product for retail 3D printing, and
hence stop offering the competitor’s standard product.
4.4 Decentralized Channel
In decentralized channel, the manufacturer and the retailer independent entities maximizing
their own profit. In-store 3D printing has started appearing in decentralized channels (Vitone,
2016), and business press predicts that it is likely to appear much more in the future when the
technology matures further (Turtle, 2014). In this section, we consider a decentralized channel
offering two standard products. In this setup we explore if and when the channel (both the retailer
and manufacturer) would agree on introducing a 3D product in the place of one of the standard
products.
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Similar to the centralized channel analysis, we first establish the optimal benchmark option in
the decentralized channel: selling 2 standard products. 3D product will be offered in the decent-
ralized channel, only if both the retailer and the manufacturer obtain at least as much profit that
they can obtain in the benchmark case.
Proposition 4.7. In a decentralized channel, when the channel offers 2 standard products:
 When (R− c) < t: market remains uncovered and the retailer makes the profit πBMr =
(R−c)2
4t
and the manufacturer makes the profit πBMm =
(R−c)2
2t .
 When (R− c) ≥ t: market will be covered and the retailer makes the profit πBMr = t4 and the





Adopting in-store 3D printing and offering a 3D product involves a set of decisions from the
manufacturer and the retailer. Following are the sequence of the decisions that we consider in our
work:
1. Manufacturer sets the delegation level γ for the 3D product
2. Retailer decides the investment level µ for 3D printer
3. Manufacturer sets the wholesale prices for both 3D product and the standard product: wd
and ws
4. Retailer sets retail prices for both the 3D product and the standard product line: pd and ps
Similar to the centralized channel, we first study the optimal 3D printer investment decision (µ∗)
for any exogenously given delegated product proportion (γ) for retail 3D printing.
Proposition 4.8. In a decentralized channel, for any amount of delegation γ ∈ [0, 1]
 If (R− c) < t and γ < 2c−2R+2tc−R+2t











 If (R− c) < t and γ ≥ 2c−2R+2tc−R+2t

















 If (R− c) ≥ t
– Optimal 3D printer speed µ∗ = 0
Key takeaway from Proposition 4.8 is that when the market is covered with benchmark (2
standard products) case (R−c ≥ t), retailer will not invest in a 3D printer and in-store 3D printing
will not be implemented. Interestingly, even if the 3D printer can be purchased at no cost (M → 0),
the retailer will not prefer in-store 3D printing and customization. In contrast, when the market is
not covered with the benchmark case (R− c < t), retailer will invest in a 3D printer as long as the
investment cost is low enough.
Proposition 4.9. ∃ conditions on {M,T, k, t} such that γ∗(M,T, k, t) > 0.
Proposition 4.9 shows that the manufacturer will prefer in-store 3D printing and delegate a non-
zero proportion of the product, as long as the investment and product design cost of delegation are
low enough, and if retailer participates.
We interpret Proposition 4.8 and 4.9 as follows: In niche markets where the product’s valuation
is relatively low compared to customers’ intensity of preferences, in-store printing will be imple-
mented by decentralized channel. On the other hand, in saturated markets where the product’s
valuation is relatively high compared to customers’ intensity of preferences, in-store printing will
not be implemented. It is also important to contrast these results with equivalent centralized chan-
nel result (Proposition 4.2). In a centralized channel, in-store 3D printing will be adopted for both
niche and saturated markets, as long as the investment cost is small enough.
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4.5 Decentralized Channel with Competition and the Importance of Buzz Effect
When the 3D product is sold at a retail store, it is also more likely that a standard product
from a competitor is sold alongside. For example, Foot Locker — a retailer — may offer retail 3D
printing of an Adidas shoe. However, it is also likely that the retail store offers Nike’s standard
shoes —a competing product for the manufacturer — as well. We consider this scenario in this
section, and highlight the challenges of in-store 3D printing adoption.
We consider a manufacturer offering a standard product which is sold a by a retailer. The
retailer also sells another standard product from a competitor. Given this setup, we explore if the
manufacturer and the retailer would adopt retail 3D printing profitably in the presence of the com-
petitor’s standard product. Similar to the previous sections we first establish the benchmark case
where the manufacturer sells a standard product without any in-store 3D printing. For establishing
this benchmark, we consider the following sequence of events: manufacturer and the competitor
sets wholesale prices for their products simultaneously, which is followed the retailer’s decision of
retail prices for both products. For establishing the benchmark, and throughout our analysis in this
section, we assume that the market is saturated enough such that the two products will compete at
the retail level in equilibrium. This translates to the following parametric condition: (R− c) ≥ 32 .
Proposition 4.10. In a decentralized channel, when the firm offers its standard product through a
retailer who also offers a standard product from a competitor, the manufacturer will capture half of
the market, and will make a profit of t2 . Competitor will capture the other half of the market, and
will make the same profit of t2 . Retailer will make a profit of R− c−
5t
4 .
Now, we consider a case where manufacturer considers offering a 3D product through the
retailer. Following are the sequence of events: 1) manufacturer decides the delineation level (γ),
2) retailer decides the 3D printer investment (µ), 3) both manufacturer and the competitor sets
wholesale prices simultaneously (wf , wc) and 4) retailer sets retail prices for both the 3D product
and the standard product from the competitor (pf , pc).
Proposition 4.11. In a decentralized channel, when the channel has an option of offering in-store
3D printing alongside a competitor’s product at the retail store:
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 However, manufacturer will decide γ∗ = 0
Proposition 4.11 highlights the difficulty in offering in-store 3D printing in decentralized setting
in the presence of competition. Offering a 3D product enables higher level of customization, and
reduces the effective distance between the 3D product and the competitor’s standard product.
This effect intensifies wholesale price competition between the two manufacturers. Retailer benefits
both from the customization (as he charge higher retail price), and also from the wholesale price
competition as the wholesale price goes down. Hence, if a 3D product option os provided by the
manufacturer, retailer will comply and invest in a 3D printer, as long as the investment cost is
not too high. However, manufacturer’s gain from customization is outweighed by the increased
intensity of wholesale price competition. Hence, manufacturer will not adopt in-store 3D printing.
Contrasting with Proposition 4.6, we can see that a centralized channel may compete with in-store
3D printing strategy, but the decentralized channel will not.
4.5.1 Impact of Buzz Effect
In-store 3D printing not only offers customization, but it also creates a buzz effect through the
new technology (Trinh, 2017; Vitone, 2016). This buzz effect increases the number of customers
visiting the store, hence increasing the potential demand for the retail store. Interesting point to
note is that standard product sold at the retail store also stands to benefit from the buzz effect.
We explain the way we model buzz effect in Section 4.2.3. Other than for considering the buzz
effect we consider the same setup, and sequence of events as considered in Proposition 4.11.
Proposition 4.12. In a decentralized channel, when the channel has an option of offering in-store
3D printing alongside a competitor’s product at the retail store, and if there is a buzz effect for
in-store 3D printing:











 Manufacturer’s delegation decision:
(




→ (γ∗ > 0)
First part of Proposition 4.12 is similar to Proposition 4.11, and says that the retailer will be
willing to invest in a 3D printer as long as the investment is not too expensive relative to customers’
waiting time threshold. However, we can see that the buzz effect allows for customers’ waiting time
to be lower, as the right hand side of the inequality is lower with the buzz effect. More important
result here is in the second part of the Proposition 4.12: when the buzz effect is large enough,
manufacturer is guaranteed to adopt retail 3D printing as well. Hence, the whole decentralized
supply chain benefits from buzz effect, and it enables the adoption of in-store 3D printing.
4.6 Conclusions and Future Research
Our work highlights the challenges of offering in-store 3D printed product in a decentralized
channel. Though business press predicts wider implementation of decentralized retail 3D printing,
we show that it is more likely to occur in more niche markets, where the standard product line is
not very big. We also show the importance of buzz effect in decentralized setting with competition.
A large buzz effect is necessary for in-store 3D printing to be successful in decentralized setting with
competition. Our result also highlights that a firm cannot use in-store 3D printing as a means to
compete with a higher or same quality product. However, in-store 3D printing can increase profits
in a competition, if the firm’s product is of a higher quality. In contrast, in-store 3D printing can
be employed under a wider range of markets by a centralized channel, as long as the investment
and delegation costs are small enough.
Currently, we assume that buzz effect simply increases arrival rate to the store, and the newly
arriving customers are identical to the original customers (same reservation value and taste in-
tensity). In the future we plan to consider the situation where the new buzz induced traffic may
have different characteristics: for example, they may have higher taste intensity than the original
customers. Currently, we also assume that the whole customer population has the same waiting
time threshold. However, in reality, some customers may have higher wait time threshold than
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the others. We plan to incorporate this other dimension of customer heterogeneity in waiting time
thresholds, in our future extension of this work.
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CHAPTER 5: Product Design Innovation in the Maker Movement: Impact of
Innovator Learning, Innovativeness, and Manufacturability
3D printing democratizes manufacturing by enabling end users to manufacture products them-
selves and fuels the maker movement (Ihl and Piller, 2016; Lipson and Kurman, 2010; Anderson,
2012). Halverson and Sheridan (2014) define maker movement as the growing number of people
who are engaged in the creative production of artifacts in their daily lives and who find physical and
digital forums to share their processes and products with others. While 3D printing has made the
actual ”making” in the maker movement more efficient and reliable, the other critical component
of this movement is sharing of digital designs and manufacturing know-how. Makers share their
product design with others using 3D design sharing platforms Rayna et al. (2015). In this essay, we
study the success and diffusion of product designs shared in one such 3D design sharing platform
called thingiverse.com.
We study the success and diffusion of design innovations which lead to follow on innovations
and/or to manufactured products. We explain the variance in diffusion patterns using design
elements — such as design intricacy and manufacturability — and innovator learning. In this
context, innovators learn by making products designed by other innovators. Our research studies
how learning by making other innovators’ products helps innovators in their subsequent creations.
Our data is obtained by scrapping a major 3D design sharing website in the maker movement
—“thingiverse.com”. We obtained a panel data set containing more than 200,000 innovators and
780,000 product designs that they created over 9 years. The dataset also includes information on
how many times a product design is manufactured and by whom.
One challenge in working with the data from maker movement is the unstructured nature of the
data. An innovation in this context — a 3D product design — needs careful processing to decode its
features in a format amenable for econometric analysis. We decode features such as design intricacy
and manufacturability from unstructured 3D geometry data using 3D printing domain knowledge
and research in the field of computer graphics. After decoding these features, we use economet-
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rics for causal inference. Specifically, we study how various product design popularity measures
are impacted by product design complexity/intricateness and manufacturability parameters. Our
preliminary results, from randomly sampled representative data, shows the importance of learning
by making. Through this result, we show that the makerspace platforms such as “thingiverse.com”
can effectively foster community-driven innovation by nudging their community to learn by making
(3D printing) more designs.
5.1 Literature Review
As we study the diffusion of design innovations, our work is related to the rich innovation
diffusion literature in marketing. We provide a small sample of this literature here. Bass (1969)
presented a breakthrough model of product/innovation diffusion that paved the way for many other
models (Mahajan et al., 1991) that improved upon it. Yoganarasimhan (2011) studies the diffusion
of social media content - specifically on YouTube. Trusov et al. (2009) empirically estimate the
bass model in the context of word of mouth marketing on a social networking website. From
an innovation perspective, Alcácer and Gittelman (2006) studies patent citations and the impact
of examiner induced citations. From an operations perspective, Kumar and Swaminathan (2003)
study the diffusion of innovations under supply constraints. To the best of our knowledge, our work
will one of the first to study the innovation diffusion in the context of engineering product designs.
Our work is related to open innovation, as the maker movement and thingiverse platform are
part of an open innovation ecosystem. Baldwin and von Hippel (2011) demonstrate the paradigm
shift from the user innovation and the subsequent collaborative user innovation. Majchrzak et al.
(2004) explores the knowledge reuse process in the context of radical open innovation. West and
Bogers (2017) provides an integrative review of open innovation literature and provide further
research directions.
Our work’s main goal is to understand how some design innovations in the maker movement
are more successful than the others. Hence, our work is closely related to the maker movement.
Anderson (2012) provides a nice historical perspective on how maker movement came about, and
its progress. Ihl and Piller (2016) and Dickel et al. (2016) explain 3D printing’s role in enabling
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the maker movement. Halverson and Sheridan (2014) explains the role of maker movement in
education. Letizia Mortara (2016) explore the way 3D printing and maker movement is fueling
entrepreneurship.
We aim to understand 3D geometric data and its evolution to characterize its innovativeness.
Hence, it is also related to the research on geometric similarity in computer science and geometric
modeling (Tangelder and Veltkamp, 2004; Bell and Bala, 2015; Osada et al., 2002). Our work uses
this stream of research to answer questions that are relevant for business/innovation researchers. We
utilize the measures of geometric complexity from the literature (Sukumar et al., 2008; Rossignac,
2005) to characterize our unstructured 3D model data.
5.2 Design Sharing and Diffusion in Maker Movement
One critical driver of the maker movement is the ability of individual designers and makers to
share their product design freely. Such a sharing ecosystem also allows other designers to derive and
improve upon the shared designs to make them more functional, innovative and/or manufacturable.
There are many such design sharing portals such as thingiverse , GrabCAD and MyMiniFactory.
Each of these platforms have slightly different focus: some are general purpose allowing designs from
a variety of categories such as thingiverse, whereas others targeted for specific functional objects
such as GrabCAD. They also differ in terms of the amount of derivations they allow on uploaded
designs. When a design is allowed to be derived by both the platform and the original inventor, the
community of other innovators can improve or adpat the design and share their modified designs.
For developing a design sharing platform, deciding upon the amount of derivation allowed and its
mechanism is a key decision. We explain the mechanism of design sharing in the maker movement
from the perspective of a platform that allows derivation freely, such as thingiverse.
When a design is uploaded into the platform, it becomes available to the maker community
through a range of license options - generally variants of Creative Commons. Maker community
can now view and download these designs. They also generally have an option of liking and include
these designs in their own collections. They can print the downloaded designs in variety of 3D
printers they may have access to. After they print the designs, they also may upload their print
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Figure 5.1: Activities in a Design Sharing Platform
settings and a snapshot of the printed object back to the original design in the platform - called
makes.
In addition to downloads and makes, maker community can also modify a design (if the license
allows for it), and upload the design back to the platform. A design inspires derivations for a variety
of reasons. A design could be derived because it inspired a completely different product/artifact;
it could be derived because it had a manufacturing issue, and the derived design corrects for it; it
could be derived to customize it better for a specific application.
Maker movement in general, and design sharing platforms in particular, are growing rapidly.
A rigorous understanding of what makes a design successful in terms of downloads and further
derivations could be immensely helpful to design or tweak design sharing platforms.
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5.3 Hypothesis Development
A very large number of product designs get uploaded by a number of designers in design sharing
platforms such as thingiverse. Some of these designs are highly successful - measured in terms of
downloads, makes and likes. On the other hand, many other designs are not so successful. If the
design sharing platform can understand what makes a design more successful, they can nudge the
designers to adopt those best practices. They can also promote those designs that are estimated
be more successful, by placing them prominently in their website. Individual designers can benefit
from this understanding as well, as it can help them come up with better designs. Another key
facet of these design sharing platforms is the aspect of design diffusion in the form of derivations.
Again, one can see in these platforms that some of the designs are derived very often while many
designs never get derived. In our research we focus on what improves key popularity measures of
the designs — downloads, makes and likes — and the diffusion measure of derivation.
We first hypothesize that the innovator’s (who created the design) has a positive influence on
the designs success. How people learn from experience and doing something may time has been
well documented in the literature Narayanan et al. (2009); Kc et al. (2013).
Hypothesis 1: Innovator’s learning positively impacts their design’s popularity measures (down-
loads and makes/copies) and derivations
1 a) The design benefits from the innovator’s previous design experience.
1 b) In addition, the design also benefits from innovator’s previous experience of making
other people’s designs (learning by making).
A design’s success depends on the amount of interest it generates. Given the context of 3D
printing and the expectation that 3D printed designs can be geometrically intricate, we hypothesize
that the designs that are geometrically intricate are likely to be more popular.
Hypothesis 2: Geometric Intricacy of a product design positively impacts the design’s popularity
measures (downloads and makes/copies) and derivations.
While geometric complexity may attract attention, if the product is very difficult to correctly 3D
print, the design will not be very popular. Taking this into account, we hypothesize the following:
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Figure 5.2: Growth of New Product Designs in Thigiverse
Hypothesis 3: Manufacturing Complexity of a product design negatively impacts the design’s
popularity measures (downloads and makes/copies) and derivations.
Main goal of the design sharing platforms is to provide a forum for sharing the designs that will be
3D printed (or made using other manufacturing methods). If the shared design will cost a lot of
money to produce (or equivalently take a long time to be 3D printed), the design will not be very
popular among the community. Considering this fact, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 4: Higher Manufacturing Cost of a product design negatively impacts the design’s
popularity measures (downloads and makes/copies) and derivations.
5.4 Data
We study these research questions using data from the most popular design sharing website:
thingiverse.com. We obtained the data through a combination of thingiverse API and scarping
publicly available information. We obtained a panel data set containing more than 200,000 in-
novators and 780,000 product designs that they created from the inception of the platform until
April 2017. Figure 5.2 shows the explosive growth in the number of new designs uploaded to the
platform. The figure also differentiates between designs which are simple modifications of existing
designs vs more original designs.
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Figure 5.3: Data: Contents and Structure
Figure 5.3 shows the structure of our data. We have detailed information about every design
(called a thing) including its 3D geometry, date of creation, its ancestors (if it is derived using
other designs), its derivatives (designs inspired by this design), popularity measures (downloads,
likes, makes) and more. We also have information about all designers who have created at least
one design in this period. For every designer, we have various activity timestamps, designed things,
printed things (makes of others’ designs), and more information. We also know about every make
: when a person prints a design in the platform.
5.5 Measure Development
Most things or designs in thingiverse has its associated 3D geometry. There are cases where
the 3D geometry was not available. We restrict our analysis to cases where the 3D geometry is
available. Thingiverse allows 3D geometry to be represented in a few different formats. Among
them the most popular by far is Stereo Lithography Format (STL). This format represents the 3D
geometry of the design as triangular facets. From the given STL file, we extract the following
features: design intricacy, manufacturing complexity, filament length, printing time
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5.5.1 Design Intricacy
For characterizing design intricacy, we utilized algorithms from engineering literature and iden-
tified the number of shells, geometric features such as surface holes, edges and the overall volume.




∗ (1 + Surface Holes) ∗ Shells (5.1)
We adopt a simplified version of geometric complexity of 3D models used in the engineering liter-
ature(Sukumar et al., 2008; Rossignac, 2005).
5.5.2 Manufacturing Complexity
In this measure we attempt to capture the 3D printing complexity of the designs. 3D printer
works by moving the print head in all the 3 axis and either depositing material (FDM) or by
selectively solidifying (SLS) it. If the product design can be printed using single axis movements
of the print head, then the design is easy to manufacture. If the printer needs to make multi-axis
movements more often, then it increases the chances of printing defects in final product. Considering
this, we define manufacturing complexity as follows:
Manufacturing Complexity =
Number of Multi-Axis Movements of the Print Head
Total Movements of the Print Head
(5.2)
We obtain the number and type of moves needed to 3D print an object by using an API provided
by the 3D printer company MakerBot(Walker, 2019). This code creates computer code for the 3D
printer movement for a given 3D geometry file.
Printing Time: We obtain this estimate from an API from MakerBot by passing the geometry
representation of the design.
5.5.3 Innovator Learning
We measure innovator learning at a design level: we measure the innovator’s experience until
the point the innovator has created the specific design. We measure innovator learning using three
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different variables:
 Exp P latform = Number of days in Thingiverse – for the author of this design
 Exp Designs = Number of designs created by the author of this design before this design
(learning by designing)
 Exp Copies = Number of copies/makes created by the author of this design before this design
(learning by making)
5.6 Control Variables
Date of Upload: The date of upload serves to disentangle the platform’s popularity at different
points in time from the specific design’s popularity Are printing instructions found: For some
designs, designers add instructions for printing that design. This generally involve printer settings
and slicing settings.
Is created using customizer tool: When a design is created using the customizer tool
(introduced by MakerBot in 2013), it tends to be a simple dimensional scaling. Such designs
created from the customizer tool are considered non-original by the community.
License: A set of dummy variables that represents the license under which the designs was
shared.
5.6.1 Design Category
Every design in the thingiverse data has a category assigned to it, which was originally selected
by the designer. Our data sampled for this analysis, contains 80 unique categories. We aggregate
these categories into two higher level categories: Aesthetic and Functional. We perform this ag-
gregation because the proliferation of 80 categories may pose challenges during estimation and is
very likely to have multicollinearity issues. On the other hand, we posit that differentiating and
controlling for functional and aesthetic products are important, as they may have very different
user behavior. We make this classification currently using our judgment of the category chosen by
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the designer. In the future, we plan to adopt a more robust approach for this categorization using
multiple people.
5.7 Sampling and Cleaning for the Analysis
We have randomly sampled 25, 000 designs from overall corpus of data for the current analysis.
We have also restricted our analysis to designs with only one component part and not assemblies
with multiple parts. We restricted the data in this way for the current analysis for two reasons:
1) our geometry processing code is not fully optimized and hence slow to process the full quantum
of data, and 2) we have not yet developed and implemented geometric complexity metrics for
component assemblies. From this data, we dropped all the designs which are not manifold solids.
Being a manifold solid means that it is a valid solid representation that can be directly 3D printed.
Some designs in thingiverse are not designed properly and may have hanging edges, and non
manufacturable shapes. Our geometry processing code detects such shapes and drops those designs
from the analysis. After this, we have 18, 522 data points for the current analysis.
In the future, we plan to optimize our code to handle the entire corpus of data and also handle
designs representing component assemblies.
5.8 Model and Results
5.8.1 Model Setup and Variables
We describe our priliminary results in this section. As our popularity measures are count vari-
ables, we employ negative binomial regression (Note: We have also tested Poisson regression.
However, we found that dispersion in the data does not support the assumptions of Poisson regres-
sion.) for our analysis. We will use downloads and copies as the popularity measures and they will
be our response variables. Copy (Copies) is a word used in thingiverse system for makes or the
number of times a 3D design is printed by other users. Following are the three models that we run
to test our hypotheses:
1. Downloads ∼ {Exp P latform,Exp Things,Exp Copies,Geom Intricacy,
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Manf Complexity, Print T ime,CONTROLS}
2. Copies ∼ {Exp P latform,Exp Things,Exp Copies,Geom Intricacy,
Manf Complexity, Print T ime,CONTROLS}
3. Derivatives ∼ {Exp P latform,Exp Things,Exp Copies,Geom Intricacy,
Manf Complexity, Print T ime,CONTROLS}
5.8.2 Results of the Model on Downloads:
Regression results table is provided in the Appendix (Figure A4.1). We find that both the
innovator learning measures have significant positive influence on downloads, thus confirming Hy-
pothesis 1. We also find that the geometric intricacy of designs is positively influencing downloads:
this yields support for Hypothesis 2. On the other hand, we find that manufacturing complexity
is also positively influencing downloads. Hence, Hypothesis 3 does not find support. Printing time
seems to have a negative relation to downloads as the coefficient is negative. However the coefficient
is not highly significant.
5.8.3 Results of the Model on Copies:
Copies represent the design’s popularity and manufacturability, as it has to be first 3D printed
and uploaded back to be counted as a Copy. Regression results are provided in the Appendix
(Figure A4.2). Similar to the case of downloads, we find that both the innovator learning measures
have significant positive influence on copies as well, thus confirming Hypothesis 1. We however
find that the geometric intricacy and manufacturing complexity do not have a significant impact
of copies. Hence Hypothesis 2 and 3 are not supported. Printing time has a significant negative
relation to copies. Hence Hypothesis 4 is supported.
5.8.4 Results of the Model on Derivatives:
Derivatives represent the number of other designs that are inspired from it. In his model we only
find support for Hypothesis 1 b): learning by doing has a significant positive impact on derivatives.
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Printing time seems to have a negative relation to derivatives as the coefficient is negative. However
the coefficient is not highly significant.
5.9 Conclusions and Planned Future Work
In this essay, we study the success and diffusion of design innovations which lead to follow on
innovations and/or to manufactured products. We formulate our hypotheses that the popularity
and the diffusion of designs are influenced by design elements such as design intricacy and manufac-
turability, and innovator learning. Using a dataset from the design sharing platform thingiverse, we
test our hypotheses. We find that innovator learning from making other designs plays a key role in
all the metrics that we studied. This indicates that the platforms should nudge designers to print
more from other designers in order to make them better designers. We also find that geometric
intricacy of a design influences the design’s downloads. However, it does not seem to have strong
effect on copies.
We plan to study these questions in much more depth using the whole corpus of data in the
future. We also plan to study design uniqueness (how different it is from other designs in the
platform) as an additional measure. We plan to extend our analysis so that it can handle assemblies
(designs with multiple sub-designs). We plan to develop more manufacturability measures by
detecting manufacturability issues such as overhangs and thin sections which prevent the design
from correctly 3D printed.
68
CHAPTER 6: Conclusions & Future Research
In my dissertation, we explore how 3D printing can impact different aspects of a supply chain.
In the first three essays, we study how 3D printing can lead to innovative business models. Through
our research in these essays, we highlight the opportunities and pitfalls in adopting 3D printing
for improving a firm/channel’s profit. We attempt to bridge the gap that exists in the literature
and practice (Cohen et al., 2015b) about the best way to incorporate 3D printing in firms’ business
models. In the fourth essay, we study the open innovation enabled by 3D printing in the maker
movement.
In the future, we plan to further extend our research projects around 3D printing business mod-
els and the maker movement. We studied retail 3D printing with the customization perspective.
However, in functional product markets, the main driver of retail 3D printing is likely to be mitig-
ation of demand uncertainty. In the future, we plan to take this perspective, and study how retail
3D printing could help mitigate demand uncertainty. In our current work about maker movement,
our focus is on innovator learning. In the future, we plan to study the maker movement from the
perspective of iterative and open product development.
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APPENDIX 1: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS AND LEMMAS IN
CHAPTER 2
Lemma A1.1.
In monopoly and duopoly, for any customer type distribution, following bounds hold for tradi-
tional firm’s decisions (qt and pt) and PF firm’s decision (pp), for the respective firms to obtain
positive profit: 0 < qt < 1, q
2
t < pt < qt and 0 < pp <
1
4 . Firms will make zero profit by setting
their decision at these bounds.
Proof.
We need 0 < qt < 1 for some θ ∈ [0, 1] to have positive utility: Ut(qt, pt; θ) = θqt − pt > 0.
We need q2t < pt < qt for the traditional firm to have a positive margin and demand. We need




p (pp; θ) =
θ2
4 − pp > 0 for some θ ∈ [0, 1]. Setting the decisions at bounds will lead
to zero demand or zero margin.
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
We shall derive the optimal profit of a traditional firm, followed by a PF firm.
Traditional Firm: As Ut(qt, pt; θ) increases in θ, there exists a θm = ptqt such that all θ ≥ θm
will buy the product. Hence we have:
Dt(pt, qt) = 1− θm = 1−
pt
qt




. From Lemma A1.1, 0 < qt < 1, q
2
t < pt < qt and the firm will make zero profit at the
boundary. Hence, if there is a unique local maximizer leading to positive profit, that is also











. We also find that {q∗t , p∗t } is the unique local maximizer and hence

















(q∗t θ − p∗t ) dθ = 154 .
PF Firm: As U∗p (pp; θ) is increasing in θ, there exists a θm :
θ2m
4 − pp = 0 and all θ ≥ θm will
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buy the product. As θm ∈ [0, 1], we have θm = 2
√
pp. Now, we have:
Dp(pp) = 1− 2
√
pp
Πp(pp) = pp(1− 2
√
pp)
Πp(pp) is concave in pp. So, from the first order conditions, the unique global maximizer is
given by: p∗p =
1


















dθ = 7324 .







Proof of Proposition 2.2.
In any SPNE, one firm will choose a higher quality than the other, which we denote as high
quality firm (subscript h) and we denote the other firm as low quality firm (subscript l): 0 < ql < qh.
For both the firms to have positive market share, we need to have a marginal customer θm ∈ [0, 1],
who is indifferent about purchasing from either firm: Ut(ql, pl; θm) = Ut(qh, ph; θm). We can now
obtain θm =
ph−pl
qh−ql . All θ ∈ [θm, 1] will buy from the high quality firm; all θ < θm will buy from the
low quality firm, as long as they get a non-negative utility i.e., θ ∈ [plql , θm]. Now we can define the
profit function of the low quality firm and the high quality firm.










Both the profit functions are concave in their respective prices. Hence, we firms’ best response
prices are found from their respective first order conditions. Firms’ best response prices lead to the
following equilibrium prices:
p∗l (ql; qh) =
ql(qh − ql + 2qlqh + q2h)
4qh − ql
p∗h(qh; ql) =
qh(ql(ql − 2) + 2qh(1 + qh))
4qh − ql
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After substituting equilibrium prices, the profit functions are given by:
Πl(ql; qh) =
qlqh (qh − ql) (1 + qh − ql) 2
(4qh − ql) 2
(A1.1)
Πh(qh; ql) =
q2h (qh − ql) (ql + 2qh − 2) 2
(4qh − ql) 2
(A1.2)
Πl(ql; qh) is concave in ql as long as ql <
5
6 . We have ql < qh by definition. When qh >
2
3 , low quality
firm can obtain the demand of all buying customers (leading to zero demand for the high quality
firm) by setting ql = 2(1−qh) and act as a monopoly. Low quality firm’s (monopoly) profit decreases
in ql > 2(1− qh), when qh > 23 . So, we will always have ql <
2
3 and hence Πl(ql; qh) is concave in ql
in its effective action space. We find that the solution to the first order condition on Πl(ql; qh) is





the low quality firm will set ql = 2(1 − qh). So, the low quality firm’s best response is given by






, and qBRl = 2(1− qh), otherwise.
For the high quality firm, from the first and second order conditions of Πh(qh; ql), we find that
there is a unique local maximizer q̂h(ql), which is also the global maximizer, as the action space
boundaries qh = ql and qh = 1 give zero profit for the high quality firm. Hence, q
BR
h = q̂h(ql).
The intersection of qBRl and q
BR
h is unique and leads to the quality equilibrium: q
∗
l u 0.199361






, which is necessary for this equilibrium to
exist. Back substituting the quality equilibrium values in price equilibrium equations leads to the
following profits and prices : Π∗l u 0.012149,Π∗h u 0.0164064, p∗l u 0.0750102 and p∗h u 0.226656.
As the firms have identical cost structure, either firm 1 or firm 2 can take up high quality
position and we have two symmetrical SPNEs. We can also note that: Π∗h > Π
∗
l .
Proof of Proposition 2.3.
Formulating Demands and Profits for PF and Traditional Firms: There are possibly
two marginal customers θm1 and θm2 , who are indifferent to buying from PF or traditional firm:{
θm : U∗p (pp; θm) = Ut(qt, pt; θm)
}
. The explicit expressions for the marginal customers are given
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by:




pp − pt + q2t
)
(A1.3)




pp − pt + q2t
)
(A1.4)
θm1(qt, pt, pp) and θm2(qt, pt, pp) can lead to 3 different types of equilibria and demand structures.
To characterize these equilibria, we define the cut-off customer θ0 = MIN [{θ | Ut(qt, pt; θ) = 0}, {θ |
U∗p (pp; θ) = 0}]. Because Ut and U∗p increase in θ, only θ ≥ θ0 will buy one of the products. The
type of equilibrium where PF firm captures the high end customers is hereafter referred to as type
1 equilibrium: θm2 ∈ [θ0, 1] and θm1 < θ0, where θ0 =
pt
qt
. This condition can be rewritten as
p2t
4q2t
≤ pp ≤ 14 + pt − qt. Profits attained by both the firms in type 1 equilibrium are:






pp − pt + q2t
))














In type 2 equilibrium, traditional firm will capture the high end customers: θm1 ∈ [θ0, 1] and
θm2 > 1. This condition can be rewritten as
1
4 + pt − qt ≤ pp ≤
p2t
4q2t
. Profits attained by both the
firms in type 2 equilibrium are:
















1− 2qt + 2
√
pp − pt + q2t
)
Finally, in type 3 equilibrium, PF firm will capture both the high and low end of the market,
leaving the traditional firm with the mid-segment: θ0 < θm1 ≤ θm2 < 1. Profits attained by both
the firms in type 3 equilibrium are:

















pp − pt + q2t
We shall solve the multi-stage game backwards, starting from the price decision of the PF firm for
a given price (pt) and quality level (qt) of the competing traditional firm.





4 + pt − qt and then otherwise (
p2t
4q2t




≤ 14 + pt − qt:
PF firm’s price pp can lead to type 1 structure (θm1 < θ0 ≤ θm2 ≤ 1) if
p2t
4q2t
≤ pp ≤ 14 + pt − qt or
type 3 structure (θ0 < θm1 ≤ θm2 < 1) if pt − q2t ≤ pp <
p2t
4q2t
and pt < 2q
2
t . Type 2 structure is not
possible.
When pt ≥ 2q2t , pp ∈ [
p2t
4q2t
, 14 + pt − qt], representing only type 1 structure. Π
T1
p (pp; pt, qt) is not
concave in pp. Hence, we check the local maximizers and the boundary points. Local maximizer of
ΠT1p (pp; pt, qt) is unique and given by p̂p















−12pt + 16q2t − 4qt + 1 + 12pt − 8q2t − 4qt + 1
)
and p̂p
T1 exists only if the following
condition is met: ΩT1(pt, qt) := 3pt − 4q2t + qt < 14 . The PF firm obtains zero demand if it chooses
the upper boundary pp =
1
4 + pt − qt. This means, when
p2t
4q2t
≤ 14 + pt − qt and pt ≥ 2q
2
t , PF firm’s
best response can either be p̂t




T1 does not exist (ΩT1(pt, qt) =
False), PF firm’s best response is to set price at
p2t
4q2t




, we have θ0 = θm2 and the traditional firm obtains zero demand.
When pt < 2q
2







, 14 + pt − qt], representing type 3 and type 1 structures respectively. The local maximizer of
ΠT3p (pp; pt, qt) is unique: p̂p









< 0}. And, p̂pT3 exists only if a condition on
pt and qt is met, which we denote as Ω
T3(pt, qt). Though the expressions for p̂p
T3 and ΩT3(pt, qt)
are available, they are long, messy and uninformative; hence, we have not presented them here.
The upper boundary pp =
1



















 ≥ 0. However, these conditions do not hold for any values of pt and
qt, when pt < 2q
2
t . When PF firm prices at the lower boundary point pp(pt, qt) = pt − q2t , PF firm
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provides at least as much utility as the traditional firm for all customers; hence, the traditional
firm makes zero demand. So, the best response function of the PF firm when
p2t
4q2t











T1 if ΩT1(pt, qt)&Π
T1
p (p̂p














T1 ; pt, qt) ≥
Max[ΠT3p (p
2






T3 ; pt, qt) ≥
Max[ΠT1p (p̂p




t − q2t ; pt, qt)]
pt − q2t o/w







> 14 + pt − qt:




type 3 structure (θ0 < θm1 ≤ θm2 < 1) if pt − q2t ≤ pp < 14 + pt − qt and qt ≤
1




2 , pp ∈ [
1
4 + pt − qt,
p2t
4q2t
]: only type 2 structure is possible. The local maximizer
of ΠT2p (pp; pt, qt) is unique and given by p̂p









< 0}; however, we have not
provided the expression here, as it is long and messy. p̂p
T2 exists only if the following condition is












the previous cases, traditional firm makes zero demand when PF firm prices at the lower boundary
point p∗p(pt, qt) =
1
4 + pt − qt.




4 + pt − qt]
and [14 + pt − qt,
p2t
4q2t




leads to zero profit for the PF firm. For the middle point pp =
1
4 + pt − qt to























≥ 0 and these conditions do not hold. So, the best response function of
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the PF firm when
p2t
4q2t









T2 if ΩT2(pt, qt)&Π
T2
p (p̂p
T2 ; pt, qt) ≥ ΠT2p (14 + pt − qt; pt, qt)
1










T2 ; pt, qt) ≥
Max[ΠT3p (p
2






T3 ; pt, qt) ≥
Max[ΠT2p (p̂p




t − q2t ; pt, qt)]
pt − q2t o/w
if qt ≤ 12
(A1.7)




T3 , or one of the boundary best responses. As the boundary best responses lead to




T1 if ΨT1(pt, qt) = True
p̂p
T2 if ΨT2(pt, qt) = True
p̂p
T3 if ΨT3(pt, qt) = True
One of the boundary best responses o/w
(A1.8)
In (A1.8), ΨTi(pt, qt) are conditions on pt and qt, when PF firm will select the corresponding
local maximizer p̂p
Ti , where i ∈ 1, 2, 3. The expressions ΨTi(pt, qt), though lengthy can be easily
combined from (A1.5) and (A1.6). If ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3},ΨTi(pt, qt) = False, PF firm will select one of
the boundary best responses.
76
Price and Quality Decision by Traditional Firm: Anticipating the best response pricing of




ΠT1t (pt, qt; p̂p
T1(pt, qt)) if Ψ
T1(pt, qt) = True
ΠT2t (pt, qt; p̂p
T2(pt, qt)) if Ψ
T2(pt, qt) = True
ΠT3t (pt, qt; p̂p
T3(pt, qt)) if Ψ
T3(pt, qt) = True
0 o/w
(A1.9)
If pt and qt are such that ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3},ΨTi(pt, qt) = False, PF firm will select one of the boundary
best responses and the traditional firm will get zero demand. From Lemma A1.1, the traditional
firm’s action space is bound by: {pt, qt} : 0 < qt < 1, q2t < pt < qt.
We first find the optimal pt and qt in type 1 profit structure, without the constraint (Ψ
T1(pt, qt)).
The unique local maximizer of ΠT1t (pt, qt; p̂p


















is the unique global maximizer. As ΨT1(pt =
1
18 , qt =
1
6) = True and








is a global maximizer in this space
as well. Hence, if the traditional firm were to set {pt, qt} such that PF firm picks type 1 structure,



















over picking any other
{pt, qt} that will result in type 2 or type 3 structure. For the PF firm to choose type 2 local


















> ΠT2t (pt, qt).
For the PF firm to choose type 3 local maximizer as best response, a condition that must be met
is ΩT3(pt, qt). Now, ∀{pt, qt} : ΩT3(pt, qt) = True, we could verify that ΠT1t
∗
> ΠT3t (pt, qt).








6 . The equilibrium is
of type 1, where PF firm occupies the high valuation segment. Traditional firm gets the profit of
Π∗t =
1












Proof of Corollary 2.1.
Competing against a traditional firm without PF strategy yields one of the following profits:
Π∗l ≈ 0.0121 or Π∗h ≈ 0.0164 (refer the proof of Proposition 2.2). Adopting PF strategy yields a
profit of Π∗p =
1






l . Hence, PF strategy
improves profitability irrespective of the benchmark being high or low quality firm.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.
Consider a traditional firm committing to the monopoly optimal quality level qcommitt =
1
3
and competing with another traditional firm. Competing traditional firm reacts to the committed
quality level, by setting its quality level and then both firms set prices simultaneously.
When one firm sets a lower quality level ql and the other sets a higher quality level qh (ql < qh),
the simultaneous move price competition results are available in the proof of proposition 2.2. Low
quality firm gets the profit of Π∗l (ql; qh) (A1.1) and high quality firm gets Π
∗
h(qh; ql) (A1.2).
We know that one firm commits to the quality level of 13 . The other firm can set a quality level
that is higher than 13 or lower than
1
3 . If the reacting firm chooses a lower quality compared to the













3). We find that q
RLow = 16 and q
RHigh ≈ 0.485. We also find that the
reacting firm will choose qR = qRLow = 16 , as that provides the reacting firm higher profit. The






54 , a margin of
1
18 and demand of
1
3 . We can now
verify that a PF firm competing against a traditional firm (refer proof of Proposition 2.3), makes
the same profit, demand and margin as the committing firm.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.
Analysis of skewed customer type distributions (FB and FT ) differ from the uniform market
case mainly in the way demand is calculated. Other than that, the proof follows the same way
as that of proposition 2.1 for monopoly and propositions 2.2 and 2.3 for duopoly. Especially, the
marginal customer expressions and firm’s market segments remain the same, given firms’ price and
quality decisions.
i) a) Monopoly:
We prove this result for a general b ∈ [0, 1]. Such a proof also guarantees that the proposition
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is true for FB ( b = 0) and FT (b = 1). We first derive the optimal qt and pt of a traditional
firm. There exists a marginal customer θm =
pt
qt
such that all customers with θ ≥ θm will buy the
product. Hence the demand faced by the firm and the profit are given by:
Dt(pt, qt; b) =
(qt − pt)((3b− 1)pt + 3(b+ 1)qt)
3(b+ 1)q2t
Πt(qt, pt; b) = (pt − q2t )
(qt − pt)((3b− 1)pt + 3(b+ 1)qt)
3(b+ 1)q2t
From Lemma A1.1, 0 < qt < 1 and q
2
t ≤ pt < qt. Unique local maximizer for Πt(qt, pt; b) is













12b−4 , which we obtained from first
order conditions and verified for joint concavity at that point; the expressions are also the global
maximizers because the boundary of the solution space leads to zero profit. Now, we derive the
optimal price pp of a PF firm. Proceeding the same way as the proof of Proposition 2.1, we get
θm = 2
√
pp; hence the demand and profit of the PF firm is given by:
Dp(pp; b) =
−12bpp + 3b− 8
√





−12bpp + 3b− 8
√
pp + 4pp + 3
)
3b+ 3








8(1−3b)2 . We now verify that the








We first study the competition between two traditional firms and then the competition between a
PF firm and a traditional firm, to evaluate the benefit of adopting PF strategy.
Traditional Firm Vs Traditional Firm:
Bottom-heavy market FB (b = 0): The analysis follows like the proof of Proposition 2.2, where one
of the traditional firms will be choosing higher quality position than the other in the equilibrium.
The expressions for θm and the customer segments remain the same as the proof of Proposition
2.2. The critical difference now is that the demand expressions are derived using (2.4) in Section
2.3.1, with b = 0. Once, the demand and profit functions are formulated, the analysis for price
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and quality equilibrium proceeds similar to the proof of Proposition 2.2 and the equilibrium prices
are pFBl
∗ ≈ 0.0696, pFBh
∗ ≈ 0.2102 and the equilibrium quality levels are qFBl
∗ ≈ 0.1922, qFBh
∗ ≈
0.3946. High quality firm makes a higher profit (ΠFBh
∗ ≈ 0.01279) compared to the low quality firm
(ΠFBl
∗ ≈ 0.0107). We have two symmetrical SPNEs, one where firm 1 captures the high quality
position and the other where firm 2 captures the high quality position.
Top-heavy market FT (b = 1): We formulate the demand and profit functions in the similar
manner to the bottom heavy case, but with b = 1, to represent the top-heavy distribution. The
analysis for price and quality equilibrium, once again, proceeds similar to the proof of Proposition
2.2 and the equilibrium prices are pFTl
∗ ≈ 0.0782, pFTh
∗ ≈ 0.2374 and the equilibrium quality levels
are qFTl
∗ ≈ 0.2031, qFTh
∗ ≈ 0.4194. High quality firm makes a higher profit (ΠFTh
∗ ≈ 0.0202)
compared to the low quality firm (ΠFTl
∗ ≈ 0.0135). We again have two symmetrical SPNEs.
PF Firm Vs Traditional Firm:
Following on our discussion earlier, the marginal customer expressions θm1 and θm2 ((A1.3) and
(A1.4)) defined in the proof of Proposition 2.3, remain the same for any skewed distribution b ∈
[0, 1]. The cut-off customer θ0 = MIN [{θ | Ut(qt, pt; θ) = 0}, {θ | U∗p (pp; θ) = 0}] defined in the
proof of Proposition 2.3 does not change as well. Hence, this analysis follows the same structure
as the proof of Proposition 2.2. The three types of equilibriums continue to be defined by the
following conditions: type 1 if
p2t
4q2t
≤ pp ≤ 14 + pt − qt, type 2 if
1




3 if pt − q2t < pp ≤ Min[
p2t
4q2t
, 14 + pt − qt]. In any of the equilibrium structure, if PF firm prices at
the lower boundary point, traditional firm obtains zero demand. Hence, traditional firm, as a first
mover, will not set price and quality such that PF firm chooses a boundary point. As these facts
remain same as that of the proof of Proposition 2.3, we use the same proof structure.
Top-heavy market FT (b = 1): Given θm1 , θm2 and θ0, the demands obtained by firms are now
calculated using (2.4) in Section 2.3.1, using the distribution parameter b = 1 and the resulting
profit functions are represented as ΠTip




(pt, qt; pp) for traditional
firm in type i equilibrium, where i ∈ 1, 2, 3. With these profit functions, we study the PF firm’s










3 of the type 1, 2 and 3 profit functions of the PF firm respectively, though
the expressions are long and messy. We also characterized the conditions on pt and qt, under which
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each of these local maximizers exist and PF firm will choose them as best response: ΨT
FT
i (pt, qt),
where i ∈ 1, 2, 3 . Now, knowing that if PF firm does not price at one of the local maximizers






















3 (pt, qt) = True
One of the boundary best responses o/w
(A1.10)
Anticipating the best response pricing of PF firm pFTp
∗
(pt, qt), traditional firm’s problem of









1 (pt, qt)) if Ψ
T
FT






2 (pt, qt)) if Ψ
T
FT






3 (pt, qt)) if Ψ
T
FT
3 (pt, qt) = True
0 o/w
(A1.11)
From Lemma A1.1, firm’s action space is bound by :{pt, qt} : 0 < qt < 1, q2t < pt < qt and the
boundary will result in zero profit. We first find the optimal pt and qt in type 1 profit structure
without the constraint ΨT
FT







1 (pt, qt)) is
given by {pt ≈ 0.0595, qt ≈ 0.1699}, as we find this to be the unique solution that satisfies the first
order conditions and has a negative definite Hessian matrix. This is also the unique global maxim-
izer, as the boundary points result in zero profit. We could now verify that ΨT
FT
1 (pt ≈ 0.0595, qt ≈
0.1699) = True. Since ΨT
FT
1 (pt, qt) is a more restricted solution space, {pt ≈ 0.0595, qt ≈ 0.1699} is
a global maximizer in this space as well. Hence, if {pt, qt} were to be such that PF firm picks type 1
structure, the optimal decisions are
{
pT1t
F ∗T ≈ 0.0595, qT1t
F ∗T ≈ 0.1699
}
and it will yield a profit of
ΠT1t
F ∗T ≈ 0.0102. We then verify that the traditional firm will choose
{
pT1t




any other {pt, qt} that will result in type 2 or type 3 structure. Upper bounds on the traditional
















3 (pt, qt)) re-
spectively. These represent upper bounds, as they are found without considering respective con-
straints ΨT
FT
2 (pt, qt) and Ψ
T
FT
3 (pt, qt). Through this analysis, we find the upper bounds of the
profits that the traditional firm could obtain in type 2 and type 3 equilibriums as 0.0053 and
0.0032 respectively. Now we can verify that ΠT1t
F ∗T is higher than both of these upper bounds.
Hence, the optimum pt and qt of (A1.11) is given by : pt
F ∗T ≈ 0.0595 and qtF
∗
T ≈ 0.1699 and the
unique equilibrium is of type 1, where PF firm occupies the high valuation segment. Πt
F ∗T ≈ 0.0102
and Πp
F ∗T ≈ 0.0234.
Bottom-heavy market FB (b = 0): We proceed in the same way as that of the top-heavy distri-
bution FT , other than the formulation of demand and profit functions, which now are computed
with b = 0. We derive the best response function of the PF firm for a given pt and qt, same way as
the top-heavy case, leading to the same structure as (A1.10), with different expressions. This leads
to the maximization problem faced by the traditional firm with the same structure as (A1.11). The
traditional firm’s optimal profit in type 1 structure is ΠT1t
F ∗B ≈ 0.0081 with pT1t
F ∗B ≈ 0.0469 and
qT1t
F ∗B ≈ 0.1514. We then show that ΠT1t
F ∗B dominates the profit attainable in type 2 and type 3
structures by finding an upper bound of type 2 and type 3 profits like the top-heavy case: the type
2 profit upper bound is 0.0037 and type 3 upper bound is 0.0019. We find that ΠT1t
F ∗B is higher
than both the upper bounds.
Hence, the equilibrium decisions are : pt
F ∗B ≈ 0.0469 and qtF
∗
B ≈ 0.1514 and the unique equi-
librium is of type 1, where PF firm occupies the high valuation segment. Πt
F ∗B ≈ 0.0081 and
Πp
F ∗B ≈ 0.0148
Value of PF strategy:
In both FB and FT , we find that PF strategy always improves profitability: Πp
F ∗B ≈ 0.0148 >
ΠFBh
∗ ≈ 0.01279 > ΠFBl
∗ ≈ 0.0107 and ΠpF
∗
T ≈ 0.0234 > ΠFTh
∗ ≈ 0.0202 > ΠFTl
∗ ≈ 0.0135.
ii) Value of PF strategy in FB and FT : PF strategy provides higher value in FT as com-













Proof of Lemma 2.1.
Both firms make price decisions after uncertainty is resolved. If a traditional firm can post-
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pone their quality decision until after the uncertainty is resolved, it makes all decisions after the
uncertainty is resolved. As PF firm does not make any quality decision, it also makes its decisions
only after the uncertainty is resolved. Hence, to prove this Lemma, we need to prove that in a
customer type distribution defined by b — which is known to all the firms — a PF and a traditional
monopolist will make the same profit. We already proved this result in the proof of Proposition
2.5 (part (i) (a)).
Proof of Proposition 2.6.
By Proposition 2.5 (i) (a), we know that PF strategy does not improve profitability when there
is no uncertainty. Here, we prove that it improves profitability under uncertainty. We know that
PF strategy provides the same profit as that of a traditional firm that can postpone the quality
decision (Lemma 2.1); we denote such a firm that can postpone quality decision as postponing
traditional firm. Now, we can prove this proposition by proving that a postponing traditional firm
will make higher expected profit than a traditional firm facing uncertainty.
Let us denote a traditional firm’s profit function, when the firm knows the customer type
distribution b, selects a price pt and quality qt, as Πt(pt, qt; b). As the pricing decision is made after
uncertainty is resolved, the optimal price p∗t (qt, b) is the same, whether or not the firm can postpone
the quality decision. Given p∗t (qt, b), the expected profit of the postponing traditional firm is given
by:














t (qt(b2), b2), qt(b2); b2)
)
(A1.12)
The expected profit of the (non-postponing) traditional firm that decides its quality level q̄t before
uncertainty is resolved, is given by:




t (q̄t, b1), q̄t; b1) + (1− φ)Πt(p∗t (q̄t, b2), q̄t; b2)) (A1.13)
Let q̄t
∗(b1, b2, φ) is the optimum quality level chosen by the traditional firm that cannot postpone
(by solving Equation A1.13). Also, let q∗t (b1) and q
∗
t (b2) be the optimum quality levels chosen
by the postponing traditional firm (by solving Equation A1.12). Now, as long as, b1 6= b2 and
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0 < φ < 1, we can say that either one or both of the following is true: q̄t
∗(b1, b2, φ) 6= q∗t (b1) or
q̄t
∗(b1, b2, φ) 6= q∗t (b2). The optimal quality level chosen while facing uncertainty will not be equal
to at least one of the optimal quality levels chosen by the postponing firm. This leads to our proof:




APPENDIX 2: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS AND LEMMAS IN
CHAPTER 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
Traditional product offered by the firm is characterized by its price pt and quality qt and its
location in the horizontal dimension. Since there is only a single product in the market, we can
safely consider the product to be positioned arbitrarily any point in the circle.
When t = 0: When t = 0, all the high segment customers will get a utility of θHqt − pt and
all the low segment customer will obtain the utility of θLqt − pt. These utility functions and the
discrete nature of the segments imply that the firm will set they price either as θLqt and capture
both low and high segments, or θHqt and capture only the high segment. Corresponding to this
decision optimal quality level will be q∗t =
θL




2 if they only









When t > 0: When a high type customer located at x distance horizontally from the standard
product purchases the product she will obtain a utility of θHqt− tx− pt. Setting this expression to
zero and solving for x, gives us the marginal customer of high type who will be indifferent about
purchasing the product: xh =
qtθH−pt
t . Similarly, marginal customer of low type will be given by:
xl =
qtθH−pt
t . These expressions for xh and xl are valid only when 0 < xl <
1
2 and 0 < xh <
1
2 . In
other words, only if the firm captures non zero demand in both the segments, and does not cover
either segment. We shall first analyze this case and derive the parametric conditions necessary for
this condition. Later we shall analyze the scenarios, where one or both of these conditions do not
hold.
When 0 < xl <
1
2 and 0 < xh <
1
2 : As we know that the segment thickness of the low segment
is a and the high segment is (1− a), we can write the firm’s profit function as follows:
πBMt = 2(pt − q2t )(xla+ xh(1− a)) (A2.14)








t ) is not always concave in qt. However for the firm to
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make positive profit, we need 0 < qt < 1. The end points of this space qt = 0 or 1 yield zero
profit for the firm. Hence, the local maxima of qt will be the optimal quality level, which we can
obtain from the first and second order conditions: q∗t =
1
2 (−aθH + aθL + θH) . Substituting p
∗
t and








32t . However, this result is only












2 , which translates to the following conditions:
t ≥ 14
(
−3a2θ2H + 6a2θHθL − 3a2θ2L + 2aθ2H − 2aθHθL + θ2H
)
and 3θH−4θL3θH−3θL ≤ a. This proves part of
the proposition.
When one of these conditions fail, that implies that either that the lower segment is not buying
the product xl = 0, or that one/both segments are covered xh =
1
2 .
When xl = 0 and 0 < xh <
1
2 (when the second condition fails
3θH−4θL
3θH−3θL ≤ a): In this case firm’s
demand only involves the high end segment as follows:
πBMt = 2(pt − q2t )xh(1− a) (A2.15)
Continuing our analysis in the same way as above, we get p∗t =
1









32t . This proves part of the
proposition.
When xl = 0 and xh =
1
2 (when both the conditions fail): In this case firm’s demand only in-
volves the high end segment, and the high segment is covered. Profit function remains the same
as the Equation A2.15. However optimal price is now found by p∗t = pt : xh =
1
2 , which yields





in the profit function, we get the profit of πBMt
∗




. This proves part of the
proposition. Similarly, we can analyze the condition where the first condition alone fails, which
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.
PF firm sells product designs and only sets the price for the product pp; quality level for the
product is decided by individual customers to maximize their utility. As the customers personalize
the product in the horizontal dimension by modifying the design, they do not incur any taste
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mismatch disutility irrespective of the parameter t.
Customers of high type will face the following maximization problem as their utility: maxqc(θHqc−
pp− q2c ), as they decide the quality level they want and incur the manufacturing cost for that qual-
ity level. This implies that they will select q∗c =
θH
2 , and will face a utility of
θ2H
4 − pp. Similarly,
the low type customers will obtain a utility of
θ2L
4 − pp. Given these utility functions, and the
discrete customer segments, firm may price pm =
θ2L
4 , and capture the entire demand, and will
make the profit of πm =
θ2L
4 . Or, they may price pm =
θ2H
4 , capture the high segment of size (1− a),
and make a profit of πm =
θ2H
4 (1 − a). The firm will choose the pricing option that yields them









Proof of Corollary 3.1.
Proof follows by direct comparison and substitution of results from Proposition 3.1 and Propos-
ition 3.2. We can also see that ∂(πm−π
BM
m )
∂t > 0 for every subbranch of the conditions in Proposition
3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.
From Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.3 and their proofs, we can see that the effective quality
level received by the market under optimal firm decisions depends on a threshold segment thickness




. We are considering the uncertainty of the following form: a ∈ {a1, a2} : Pr(a =
a1) = φ and Pr(a = a2) = (1−φ), where a1 < a2. First let us consider the case where a1 < a2 < a∗:
both possible segment thicknesses are below the threshold. In this case, we can see that it is optimal
for the firm to select θH2 , irrespective of whether a1 or a2 is realized. The firm will realize the same
profit as that of a firm who does not face any uncertainty. The same argument can be made for
the case where a∗ < a1 < a2.
Now, consider the case where a1 < a
∗ < a2. Let us say the firm’s quality decision while
optimizing the expected profit is q∗exp. In this case, at least in one of the possible realizations of the
segment thickness (a = a1 or a = a2), the firm’s quality decision will not be the same as the firm
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who knew the segment thickness deterministically: q∗exp 6= q∗(a1) and/or q∗exp 6= q∗(a2), this implies
that the PF firm will make higher profit in at least one of te realizations of a, while making the
samee profit in the other realization. So, we can conclude that the expected profit of PF firm will
be higher.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.
In this case customers’ production cost for a given q = βq2. Continuing the analysis in the same










Traditional firm’s profit remains unchanged as in Proposition 3.1. Now the proof follows by
direct comparison of these profit functions in various parametric cases laid out in Proposition 3.1.
∂(πm−πBMm )
∂t > 0 for every subbranch of the conditions in Proposition 3.1, as it is not dependent on
β.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.
As PF firm’s customers also incur a horizontal disutility in the partial PF case, we formu-
late the profit function in the same way as that of the proof of Proposition 3.1. We have xh =
(−dθ2H+4βdθHqp−4βθHqp+4βpp)
2
16β2(d−1)2t2 and xl =
−dθ2L+4βdθLqp−4βθLqp+4βpp
4β(d−1)t .
For the assumed parametric conditions, we know that 0 < xh < 1 and 0 < xl < 1. As we know
that the segment thickness of the low segment is a and the high segment is (1 − a), we can write
the firm’s profit function as follows:
πp = 2(pp − (1− d)q2p)(xla+ xh(1− a)) (A2.16)
We can now obtain the optimal price and quality level from first and second order conditions using














p) is convex in d, which implies that d
∗ will be one of the extreme values. Com-
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paring with the benchmark profit (Proposition 3.1) under the assumed parametric condition, we
find that PF stratgey will be profitable only if d > d#(θL, θH , a, β), where d









APPENDIX 3: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS AND LEMMAS IN
CHAPTER 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1.
For a given price ps, a customer who is positioned at a distance of x from the product will obtain
a utility of Us(ps;x) = R − ps − tx. Setting Us(ps;x) = 0, we obtain the marginal customer who
is indifferent about purchasing the product. Hence, the demand generated by a standard product
with the price ps is given by 2
R−ps
t . Profit of a centralized channel offering 2 standard products will
thus be given by: πBMc = 4(ps − c)
R−ps
t . As π
BM
c is concave in ps, optimal price of the standard
product is given by first order conditions: p∗s =
R+c
2
The demand obtained by the firm from a single product for the price of p∗s is given by
R−c
t . So,
for 2 such products the demand will be 2R−ct . But the total demand is 1. Hence the optimal price
p∗s is valid only when the market is uncovered, or when R− c < t2 . Under this condition, the profit





When R − c ≥ t2 , the market will remain covered and the firm will price such that demand








Proof of Proposition 4.2.
Standard product and the core of the 3D product are positioned at diametrically opposite ends
of the circular market: they are located at a distance of 12 . Considering that the 3D product’s core
is located at x = 0, the standard product is located at x = 12 . Due to the symmetry of the setup, we
shall only consider one half of the circle (x ∈ [0, 12 ]), while deriving the demand of each products.
The 3D product’s utility to the customer x ∈ [0, 12 ] is given by Ud(γ, pd;x) = R−pd− tx(1−γ).
The standard product’s utility is given by Us(ps;x) = R−ps− t(12 −x). We can find the end points
of market segment (marginal customers) of 3D and standard product by setting Ud(γ, pd;x) = 0
and Us(ps;x) = 0 respectively: xd =
R−pd




t . First we will analyze the case where
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the market will not be covered for optimal firm decisions : xs > xd. We will then analyze the case
where the market will be covered for optimal firm decisions : xs ≤ xd.
When the market is not covered (xs > xd) :
We can write the firm’s profit function as
πC = (ps − c)2xs + (pd − c)2xd −Mµ− kγ2 (A3.19)
Pricing Decision For a given µ and γ: As the 3D printer needs to satisfy the waiting
time constraint γµ−Ddγ ≤ T , the demand that can be satisfied by the 3D product is constrained as
Dd ≤ Tµ−γTγ . This constraint will bind in optimality. If not, the firm can reduce their investment µ
without losing any demand and obtain higher profit. Hence, we have: Dd =
Tµ−γ
Tγ
However, from the analysis of customer utilities for a given price, we found earlier that the 3D
product’s demand will be 2xd = 2
R−pd
t(1−γ) . Now setting 2xd = Dd, we can find the price that covers
the optimal demand for the given 3D printer speed µ and delegation γ : p∗d = R +
(γ−1)t(µT−γ)
2γT .
Optimal price for the standard product can be obtained through first order conditions on ps as
∂2πC
∂p2s








































if M ≤ R−cγ
0 o/w
(A3.20)
For these decisions µ∗, p∗d, and p
∗







s), which implies that we need (R− c) < t2 and γ <
2c−2R+t
c−M−R+t .
This completes the proof of the first part of the proposition.
When the market is covered (R− c) ≥ t2 or γ ≥
2c−2R+t
c−M−R+t :
Pricing Decision For a given µ and γ: We define the point where the market segments of
3D and standard products intersect as xo = {x : xs = xd}. Now, we can write the firm’s profit
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function as
πC = (pd − c)2xo + (ps − c)(1− 2xo)−Mµ− kγ2 (A3.21)
Under optimal pricing of the firm, the utility obtained at xo, for either of the products must be
zero : Ud(xo) = Us(xo) = 0. If not, the firm can increase one of the product’s price until it is the
case, without losing any demand. Now using the fact Ud(xo) = 0, we can obtain the optimal price
of the 3D product in terms of the standard product’s price as follows:




This allows us to write the profit as a function of only one of the prices (ps). Following the same
argument in the uncovered market case, the firm will set their prices in order to utilize the demand
that can be covered by given investment µ. This implies that the optimal price of the standard
product will be given by p∗s = {ps : 2xo(p∗d, ps) = Dd =
Tµ−γ

























< 0, as 0 < γ < 1. From the first order conditions, we can get the optimal 3D printer




















if M ≤ tγ
0 o/w
(A3.23)
This completes the proof of the second part of the proposition.
Proof of Corollary 4.1.
Proof of this corollary follows from the proof of Proposition 4.2. The optimal demand that will
be covered by the 3D product when the market is not covered ((R−c) < t2 and γ <
2c−2R+t
c−M−R+t) can be





2t(1−γ) . This demand expression is increasing in γ, when R − c − M > 0. However, when
γ ≥ 2c−2R+tc−M−R+t , the market will be covered.
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We find the market covered by the 3D product similarly from the second part of the proof of





∗) = t−γM2t−γt . This expression is increasing γ, and hence the
maximum market segment covered by the 3D product will be given by t−Mt .
Proof of Proposition 4.3.





∗) is convex in γ
when k < (t−2M)
2
16t . Hence under these conditions, the optimal delegation γ
∗ ∈ {0, 1}.





∗, γ = 1) with the
benchmark profit of offering two standard products (γ∗ = 0). Benchmark profits differ based on
whether the market is covered in the 2 standard products scenario (Proposition 4.1).
From these comparisons, we find that:
 When (R− c) < t2 : the firm will adopt 3D product with full delegation when
T > 2Mt−2t(c+k+M−R)−2(c−R)2+M2 and t > M .
 When (R− c) ≥ t2 : the firm will adopt 3D product with full delegation when
T > 4Mt−4t(k+M)+2M2+t2 and t > M .
The above result shows that ∃ conditions on {M,T, k, t} such that γ∗(M,T, k, t) > 0. We have
also identified conditions (in addition to k ≥ (t−2M)
2
16t ) where an interior optimum (γ
∗ ∈ (0, 1))
exists, and an expression for the interior optimum. However, the expressions involve a verbose root
functional form, and we have not presented them here.
Proof of Proposition 4.4.
Standard products from the firm and the competitor are positioned at diametrically opposite
ends of the circular market: they are located at a distance of 12 . Considering that the firm’s core
is located at x = 0, the competing product is located at x = 12 . Due to the symmetry of the
setup, we shall only consider one half of the circle (x ∈ [0, 12 ]), while deriving the demand of each
products. The firm’s and the competitor’s product’s utilities to the customer x : x ∈ [0, 12 ] is given
by Uf (γ, pc;x) = R − pf − tx and Uc(ps;x) = R − pc − t(12 − x) respectively. We can find the
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end points of market segment (marginal customers) of 3D and standard product by setting these
utilities to zero: xf =
R−pf





First we will analyze the case where the market will not be covered for optimal firm decisions
: xc > xf . In this case the products essentially operate as dual monopolies, and does not have
competitive interaction. Our main focus is on the case with competitive interaction. However, we
complete this analysis to derive the parameter conditions that will ensure that there is competition.
We can write the profit functions of the firm and the competitor as follows for a wholesale price
wc for the competitor’s product: πf = (pf − c)2xf + (pc − wc)2xc and πc = (wc − c)2xc.
















need wc > 2R − c − t. Now, given these optimal retail prices, we can find the optimal wholesale




c) is concave in wc. So, from the first order condition, we
have w∗c =
c+R







c ) ≤ xf (p∗f , p∗c , w∗c )) : (R− c) ≥
2
3 t.
When the product markets interact ((R − c) ≥ 23 t): We define the point where the
market segments of both products intersect as xo = {x : xf = xc}. Now, we can write the firms’
profit functions as: πf = (pf − c)2xo + (pc − wc)(1 − 2xo) and πc = (wc − c)(1 − 2xo). Under
optimal pricing of the firm, the utility obtained at xo, for either of the products must be zero :
Uf (xo) = Uc(xo) = 0. If not, the firm can increase one of the product’s retail price until it is the
case, without losing any demand. Now using the fact Uf (xo) = 0, we can obtain the optimal price
of the firm’s product in terms of the competitor product’s price as follows: p∗f = 2R − pc −
t
2 . We
can see that πf (p
∗
f ) is concave in ps, and we can get the optimal ps from the first order condition:
p∗s =
1




c) is concave in ws, and can obtain the
optimal wholesale price w∗s = c+
t
2 .























8 . From the above pricing and market coverage results, we can see that the
Proposition 4.4 was proved.
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Proof of Proposition 4.5.
Demand formulation for the firm (offering 3D product located at x = 0) and the competing firm
offering a standard product (located at x = 12) follows the same pattern as the proof of Proposition
4.2. 3D product’s market segment end point is given by xd =
R−pd





the benchmark analysis (proof of Proposition 4.4), we know that when (R− c) ≥ 23 t, the products’
market segments interact. This will be true even when one of the product is a 3D product, as it is a
general case of a standard product (3D product with γ = 0 will be a standard product). As stated
in the start of the section, we are focusing on this parameter condition ((R− c) ≥ 23 t) where there
is interaction between product segments and the market is covered. We define the point where the
market segments of 3D and standard products intersect as xo = {x : xs = xd}. The profit functions
for both the firms are thus given by:
πf = (pd − c)2xo + (ps − ws)(1− 2xo)−Mµ− kγ2 (A3.24)
πc = (ws − c)(1− 2xo) (A3.25)
Following the same argument in the proof of Proposition 4.2, we can derive the demand segment





Demand covered by optimal retail prices must be such that 2xo ≤ Dd.
We solve the problem backwards by first solving for the optimal retail prices (pd, ps), then thee
competing firm’s wholesale price (ws) and finally firm’s investment on 3D printer (µ). Using the
fact Ud(xo) = 0 (as argued in the proof of Proposition 4.5), we can obtain the optimal price of the
3D product in terms of the standard product’s price in terms of standard product’s retail price:
p∗d = R(2− γ)− ps(1− γ)−
1
2 t(1− γ). We find that πf (p
∗
d) is concave in ps, and the optimal price
can be found by first order conditions : p∗s =
c+2(γ−2)R−γt+t−ws
















s), we need 3D printer speed of










s) is decreasing in µ,
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the optimal 3D printer speed µ∗ ∈ [0, µ#]. In the following analysis, we will show that µ∗ ∈ {0, µ#}.
If the firm chooses a µ ∈ [0, µ#], determination of p∗d remains the same as the above ana-




s) = Dd. Hence, p
∗
s =











s) is increasing in their
wholesale price ws. This implies that they will increase their wholesale rices until the market cov-
erage condition binds: w∗s =
γRT−γt−γtT+µtT






s) is convex in
µ. This implies that µ∗ ∈ {0, µ#}.




















Proof of Corollary 4.2.
Follows directly by comparing optimal investment result in the proofs of Propositions 4.2 and
4.5.
Proof of Corollary 4.3.
The proof follows from the proof of Proposition 4.5. We can see that 3D printer investment will
be made when M ≤ −16γ
2kT+32γkT+6γtT−13tT
16γ+8γT−24T−32 . Under optimal investment the demand covered by
3D product is given by (3−γ)2(2−γ) . Clearly this demand = 1, when γ = 1. Hence, 3D product would
cover the entire market, when γ = 1 and M ≤ −16γ
2kT+32γkT+6γtT−13tT
16γ+8γT−24T−32 .
Proof of Proposition 4.6.







∗) is convex in γ when k < (t−8M)64 .
Hence under these conditions, the optimal delegation γ∗ ∈ {0, 1}.
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∗, γ = 1) with
the benchmark profit of offering a standard product (γ∗ = 0) alongside the competitor’s standard
product. Benchmark profit is given in Proposition 4.4.
From these comparisons, we find that the firm will adopt 3D product with full delegation when
the convexity condition holds, and 16(k +M) < 7t and T > − 16M16(k+M)−7t .
The above result shows that ∃ conditions on {M,T, k, t} such that γ∗(M,T, k, t) > 0. We have
also identified conditions (in addition to k ≥ (t−8M)64 ) where an interior optimum (γ
∗ ∈ (0, 1))
exists, and an expression for the interior optimum. However, the expressions involve a verbose root
functional form, and we have not presented them here.
Proof of Proposition 4.7.
Manufacturer sets the wholesale price, followed by the retail price decision of the retailer. Profit
functions of the retailer and the manufacturer in the decentralized channel offering 2 standard
products will be given by:
πBMr = 4(ps − ws)
R− ps
t
πBMm = 4(ws − c)
R− ps
t
As the profit functions are concave in respective prices, optimal wholesale and retail prices of the
standard product are given by respective first order conditions: p∗s =
1





Arging the same as the centralized case at these retail and wholesale prices, the market remains
uncovered when (R − c) < t. Under this condition the retail profit is given by πBMr =
(R−c)2
4t and
the manufacturer makes the profit πBMm =
(R−c)2
2t .
When(R− c) ≥ t, the market will remain covered and the retailer will price such that demand
generated by 2 standard products will be exactly equal to one : pMs C = R− t4 and w
M
s C = R− t2 .









Proof of Proposition 4.8.
Formulating the demand for the 3D and standard products’ segment end points in the same
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way as that of the proof of Proposition 4.2, we have xd =
R−pd





When the market is not covered (xs > xd) :
We can write the firms’ profit functions as
πr = (ps − ws)2xs + (pd − wd)2xd −Mµ (A3.28)
πm = (ws − c)2xs + (wd − c)2xd − kγ2 (A3.29)
Pricing Decision For a given µ and γ: AS the profit functions are concave in prices, we can

























3D printer Investment Decision (µ) for a given γ: As the 3D printer needs to satisfy
the waiting time constraint γµ−Ddγ ≤ T , the demand that can be satisfied by the 3D product is
constrained as Dd ≤ Tµ−γTγ . This constraint will bind in optimality. If not, the firm can reduce their
investment µ without losing any demand and obtain higher profit. Hence, we have: Dd =
Tµ−γ
Tγ .








d), we need to set an investment µ
# = γ(c−R)2(γ−1)t +
γ
T .
So, the optimal investment for the firm µ∗ ∈ [0, µ#]. Similar to the proof of Proposition 4.5, we
can show that µ∗ ∈ {0, µ#}.
From these optimal decisions, we can obtain the conditions for market to be not covered :
(R− c) < t and γ < 2c−2R+2tc−R+2t
When the market is covered (R− c) < t and γ ≥ 2c−2R+2tc−R+2t :
Pricing Decision For a given µ and γ: We define the point where the market segments of
3D and standard products intersect as xo = {x : xs = xd}. Now, we can write the firm’s profit
function as
πr = (ps − ws)2xo + (pd − wd)(1− 2xo)−Mµ (A3.30)
πm = (ws − c)2xo + (wd − c)(1− 2xo)− kγ2 (A3.31)
Under optimal pricing of the firm, the utility obtained at xo, for either of the products must be
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zero : Ud(xo) = Us(xo) = 0. If not, the firm can increase one of the product’s price until it is the case,
without losing any demand. Now using the fact Ud(xo) = 0, we can obtain the optimal price of the


















γ−2 . Now following the same kind of analysis for finding







. Again, similar to the proof of
Proposition 4.5, we can show that µ∗ ∈ {0, µ#}.
Given the above results of µ∗ for market covered and not covered cases, proof of the proposition
follows by substituting µ∗ in the retailer’s corresponding profit function, and comparing it with the
corresponding benchmark results from Proposition 4.7.
Proof of Proposition 4.9.
Continuing from the proof of Proposition 4.8, we focus on the condition t > (R − c), as only
under that condition (when further conditions hold), the retailer will invest in a 3D printer.
When M ≤ − T (c−R)
2









∗) will have an interior global optimum
delegation level (γ∗), when the following condition hold: k > (c−R+2t)
3










∗) will be higher than the benchmark of just offering a traditional
product (γ = 0). This proves the proposition.
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APPENDIX 4: REGRESSION RESULTS FROM CHAPTER 5
Table A4.1: Negative Binomial Regression Results for Downloads
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Table A4.2: Negative Binomial Regression Results for Copies
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Table A4.3: Negative Binomial Regression Results for Copies
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